Risk-Based Multi-Objective Cross-Asset Budget Planning and Allocation Framework for the Integrated Asset Management System (IAMS) Using a Case Study of the City of Sugar Land, TX. by Poudel, Alence
 1 
RISK-BASED MULTI-OBJECTIVE CROSS-ASSET BUDGET PLANNING 
AND ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATED ASSET 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (IAMS) USING A CASE STUDY OF THE CITY 






Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
Chair of Committee,   Ivan Damnjanovic 
Committee Members,  Maria Koliou 
Sarel Lavy 




Major Subject: Civil Engineering 
 




A proper strategic asset management enables one to understand what network performance can 
be achieved, at what expense, and with what associated risks. However, the current management 
approaches practiced by many cities are very parochial and limited to a single asset type, 
justifying a need for an Integrated Asset Management System (IAMS). IAMS provides an 
interface on which different assets in a facility get digitally connected. It is a data-centric 
strategic asset management system that prioritizes the maintenance and rehabilitation schedule of 
various assets based on various factors like the utility, budget, condition, and so forth. This 
research project proposes a risk-based reliability-centric asset management approach to combine 
the different single asset management strategies into a cross-asset management model using a 
case study of the asset database at the City of Sugarland, TX. The model works on the principle 
that the risk associated with an asset's failure is the function of the direct and indirect cost of 
replacement. While the direct cost of replacement is the unit cost, the indirect cost is the 
additional cost related to the failure, which typically is not quantified easily in terms of the 
monetary units. The assets are prioritized based on the highest yearly benefit to cost ratio for 
replacement, with the benefit being a reduction in the expected monetary consequences of 
failure. The outcomes of the designed model are analyzed in terms of a reduction in the network 
level expected annual failure rate, an increase in the network level average reliability, and a 
decrease in the number of assets in a very high-risk category in the risk matrix. The end product 
of the research is a SQL-based quantitative tool that allows the decision-makers to prioritize the 
cross-asset replacement under different yearly budget scenarios, allocate the replacement budget 
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1.1.  Research Motivation 
The network civil infrastructure systems have a direct impact on the functioning of society. All 
the existing civil infrastructure facilities that we see and utilize today are the result of long-term 
planning, resource allocation, money spent decades ago. But managing the facilities to maintain 
it in a usable condition is a very intricate and challenging task because it involves working with 
deteriorating and aging assets, budget constraints, changing customer demands, socio-economic-
environmental considerations. The facilities usually include a combination of assets such as 
water mains, lift stations, pavements, parks, aviation, streets, IT, and so forth. These assets 
provide necessary services, accommodations, and foster social communication and economic 
development, which are the pillars for running a city. Therefore, it is vital to maintain these 
assets periodically.  
Several organizations ranging from the government to private, are responsible for the 
effective maintenance of these facilities. While, at present, a vast majority of these facilities are 
built and managed by the government entity, there has been a significant increase in the 
participation of private entities over recent years. In this regard, be it a government or a private 
entity, these firms use different asset management models with the ultimate objective of 
providing a cost-effective, reliable, and resilient maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of the 
facilities. If not completed on time, overall maintenance expenditure will increase significantly 
as more costly initiatives will be needed to reinstate these facilities to acceptable standards 
(Seyedolshohadaie et al., 2011). 
Infrastructure facilities get exposed to increased loading and adverse weather conditions 
regularly, resulting in the severe risk of deterioration over time. In addition to the increase in the 
 2 
 
utility and environmental conditions, several other reasons act as a catalyst to contribute to their 
declining state. These include but are not limited to: 
i) A lack of strategic management for planning the new and managing of existing facilities 
resulting in a deficiency of investment and interest in the maintenance of existing 
facilities. 
ii) An ad-hoc over-optimistic approach to repair the structures on the verge of obsolescence 
resulting in a budget deficiency for the other facilities. 
iii) A lack of effective asset management models to forecast the upcoming failures and 
prioritize the MR&R of the assets based on the benefits of maintaining the facilities to the 
future economy (Jamal, 2017).   
Several literature reviews reveal that there has been a significant amount of work performed 
in the field of infrastructure management, more specifically the transportation and water 
infrastructures, over the decades. However, these twin mandates do not exist for other types of 
assets; thus, there lies a demand for an interface that can support a decision-maker prioritize 
different categories of assets into a unified system (Seyedolshohadaie, 2011). Furthermore, 
limited budgets add more problems to existing infrastructure management issues. 
Industries in the United States claim to have progressed a noteworthy advancement in 
implementing risk management with multi-criteria analysis principles to promote their industry 
exercises. However, their claims remain uncorroborated because of the lack of documentation 
and developed applications to delineate their practices. Besides, the stakeholders would ideally 
want a robust module that can unionize different categories of assets into a single system and 
prioritize the preventive maintenance under a given budget scenario. As such, one cannot 
establish a module without knowledge, analysis, and execution of system reliabilities, benefits, 
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uncertainties, and risks associated with the different assets. Thus, this research attempts to mark 
these concerns and connect the dots over the existing gaps. 
More specifically, the following observations are the motivating factors for this research:  
i. Constantly aging infrastructure facilities: 
The infrastructure facilities keep aging over time, reaching or exceeding their useful life. 
The decision-makers need to systematically account for the effective management of the 
risk and uncertainties associated with these aging facilities. 
ii. Demand for a model to combine assets of different categories into a single system for 
decision making: 
The infrastructures in a facility usually do not have the same monitoring, failure, and 
maintenance conditions. At present, the available systems model these conditions only 
for an asset of a specific type. Thus, there lies a demand for a model that can provide a 
common interface for modeling different asset categories into a unified system and 
determine their current and future MR&R needs. 
iii. Account for benefits of M&R activities. 
Typically, the representation of failure, consequence, and risk varies between assets to 
assets and management to management. As a result, it is extremely difficult to account 
for the benefits of the applied MR&R strategies in terms of the monetary units. 
Therefore, there lies a need for a framework that can support the decision-makers to 
effectively use their available resources to prioritize MR&R activities and analyze their 
trade-offs/benefits in monetary units. 
In order to resolve the concerns discussed above, this research proposes a risk-based, 
multi-criteria, strategic asset management framework that supports an enterprise to monitor and 
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manage their multi-category assets using a data-driven systematic approach. The framework 
accounts for the risks and uncertainties, forecasts the performance over time, prioritizes the 
cross-asset replacement, and evaluates the benefits of replacement in monetary units. If executed 
effectively, there are endless perks of this method, which range from improvement in the 
network level condition of the facility to an increase in their return on investment. 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The main aim of this research is, therefore, to access and model the risks and plan the 
maintenance of a wide array of assets present at any facility. More specifically, the primary 
objective of this research is to develop a risk-based reliability-centric model that can predict the 
failure of various assets, prioritize their cross-asset maintenance, allocate the maintenance funds, 
and mitigate the consequence associated with their failure. The end product research is focused 
on the development of a quantitative tool that compares the risks of one asset with another using 
the yearly benefit to cost ratio and prioritize the cross-asset replacement under the different 
budget scenario. 
1.3. Our Contributions 
When it comes to facility management, it involves the cumbersome task of working with a 
multitude of assets that may be of different kinds. It is also difficult because it requires the 
management to develop a common interface that provides a linkage among the assets. At present, 
the existing practices for most asset management firms include representing the consequences of 
failure and the likelihood of failure in terms of indexes or ordinal numbers. These numbers are 
then used to determine the risks and plan the maintenance. However, the numbers may vary 
according to the assets and the inspectors. As a result, the resultant risk obtained from the 
consequences and likelihood may be measured in the different units for the different assets.  
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Moreover, the indexes or numerical scorings to represent the condition of failure of the assets 
may not have the same definition and measure of failures within the same city. For example, the 
criteria of failure in pipelines may not necessarily define the failure in the pumps and vice-versa. 
Therefore, a risk of 5 in pipes may be completely different than that of the pumps. Furthermore, 
these indexes are also used to determine the benefits of the replacement of the asset. The 
replacement costs, however, are in terms of the monetary units, whereas the indexes are in terms 
of the numerical scores. This difference in the measurement units makes the approach analogous 
to comparing the apples with the oranges. 
This paper, therefore, attempts to create that much-needed interface to make a comparative 
analysis between the assets by: 
i. Representing the likelihood of failure in terms of the probability of failure over time. 
ii. Representing the consequences of failure in terms of monetary equivalence of failure (the 
ordinal number for consequence times the cost of replacement). 
The product of the LOF and COF now provides the expected risk, or the monetary 
consequences associated with the asset failure.  The benefit of preventive maintenance is the 
avoidance of the expected monetary consequence for the following year. For example: Suppose 
an asset with a useful life of 10 years has the failure probability or LOF in the first year = 0.1, 
COF = 5, and cost of replacement = $5. Assuming that the direct cost of replacement remains 
constant, the benefit of preventive maintenance of asset in the 1st year is that the asset will have 
an expected monetary consequence of the failure of $0.25 while if done in the 10th year, the 
consequence will be $25. Therefore, it is now equivalent to comparing oranges with oranges. 
The term preventive maintenance used in this research can be slightly misleading. Typically, 
in the field of infrastructure management, preventive maintenance of an asset does not add 
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anything significant to its useful life but only decreases its current rate of deterioration. On the 
other hand, rehabilitation and replacement increase the useful life of the asset significantly. In 
this research, the terms preventive maintenance and replacement are used interchangeably 
because whenever the prioritized assets are considered for replacement, their replacement does 
not mean that the entire facility gets replaced. For example, a typical lift station facility consists 
of several assets such as pumps, SCADA, generators, pipes, control units, and so forth. For the 
SCADA panels replaced in the first year, the maintenance strategy is a replacement, but it is just 
preventive maintenance for the lift station facility. This example is analogous to replacing the oil 
filter in the car during its periodic maintenance. The maintenance strategy is again a replacement 
for the oil filter component but is just preventive maintenance for the car system. 
1.4. Outline 
This research paper consists of the following: Chapter II provides an overview of the background 
of infrastructure management and the management approaches practiced globally.  Chapter III 
discusses risk and uncertainty in general, the concept of risk management, system reliability & 
point process, and ways to quantify risk in asset management for the decision-maker. Chapter IV 
presents the methodology to combine multitude of assets into a system to plan their preventive 
maintenance. Chapter V presents the case study where the proposed model was applied to the 
existing facilities at the City of Sugarland, TX. Chapter VI provides the discussion and 
interpretation of the results. The summary of findings, conclusions, and suggestions for future 
research are presented in Chapter VII. 
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2.   INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT 
2.1. Background of Infrastructure Management 
As per the ASCE Infrastructure Report Card 2017, the cumulative grade for the infrastructure in 
the United States is 'D+', where 'A' represents the excellent condition, and 'F' represents the 
failure state. Total funding of $4,590 billion would be required between 2016 to 2025 to bring 
the infrastructures to a 'C+' or 'adequate' category. However, estimated available funding would 
be around $2,526 billion leading to a funding deficit of $2,064 billion, and if failed to be 
addressed, it would result in almost $4 trillion of GDP lost (ASCE, 2017). Thus, the poor 
condition of existing infrastructure, along with the lack of sufficient public investment, has 
produced a significant increase in rehabilitation backlogs. As a result, these backlogs induce a 
hurdle for the decision-makers who attempt to maintain infrastructure safe and operable. If we 
look at the historic data on the infrastructure grades (Table 1), we can clearly see the trend of 
decreasing grades from 1998 to 2017.  
 
Table 1: ASCE Report Card Grades ( adapted from ASCE, 2017) 
Infrastructure 1988 1998 2001 2005 2009 2017 
Aviation B- C- D D+ D D 
Bridges - C- C C C C+ 
Drinking Water B- D D D- D- D 
Hazardous Waste D D- D+ D D D+ 
Inland waterways B- - D+ D- D- D 




Table 1: Continued 
 
 
In 2000, the expenditure by the government entity (local, state, and federal) was $64.6 
billion. As per the estimation by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), for the 
transportation system (pavement), in particular, there needs an increment of 17.5% in the 
expenditure by the government entity only to reach the projected $75.9 billion, and by 65.3% to 
reach $106.9 billion, to properly maintain and improve the condition levels of existing 
transportation assets in the United States (ASCE Infrastructure Report Card).  Assuming that the 
essential funding is available, which is rare, the government would still require a proper asset 
management system to exercise its plans. 
A proper asset management enables one to understand what network performance can be 
achieved, at what expense, and with which associated risks. The asset management systems are 
crucial because they assist the industrial practitioners in the assessment of the current condition, 
prediction of the future deterioration, selection of maintenance and repair strategies, projected 
condition after a repair, asset prioritization, and fund allocation (Elhakeem and Hegazy, 2012). 
An effective asset management system can be divided into three parts, strategic, analysis, and 
decision making (Cambridge Systematics et al., 2002). It is strategic because the management 
Infrastructure 1988 1998 2001 2005 2009 2017 
Schools D F D- D D D+ 
Solid Waste C- C- C+ C+ C+ C+ 
Transit C- C- C- D+ D D- 
Wastewater C D+ D D- D- D+ 
Overall C D D+ D D D+ 
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needs to focus on the efficiency and cost of assets to balance the priorities between the policies 
and objectives of the entity. It is analytic because the management needs to devise an action plan 
considering the historical and current data prior to making any decisions. As a result, aligning 
with these three principles would eventually allow the entities to accomplish their goal of 
effective and efficient asset management (Seyedolshohadaie, 2011). 
The decision-makers are vested in optimizing the resources spent in the maintenance of 
the facility. For this, the decision-makers undertake the analysis at four different levels: strategic, 
network, project selection, and project level. The strategic level is focused on the investment 
analysis, fund allocations, and communicating with the funding authorities. The network-level 
analysis is more detailed than the strategic level and limited within an infrastructure. It answers 
the basic questions like what, when, where, how the infrastructure management should plan 
through the use of impact, need, and gap analysis. The project selection and project level are 
very detailed and limited to a specific project within the grand scheme of projects. This paper 
focuses on network-level analysis and maintenance programming for infrastructure management. 
At the network level analysis of a single infrastructure facility, the biggest questions that need to 
be answered are: a) what assets require replacement, b) when should be the replacement, and c) 
how much is the required expenditure? The questions get further complicated when we look at 
the network of infrastructure facilities, where there are assets of different kinds subjected for the 
replacement in the same year. Ideally, given an unlimited budget, everything would be replaced 
whenever needed; however, due to the limitation in the budget, the decision-maker needs to be 
very careful about prioritizing between the assets that need replacement and that can be 
backlogged. A typical infrastructure life cycle has six phases that can be divided into two stages: 
construction and maintenance. The construction stage begins with planning, which is followed 
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by designing and ends with building the infrastructure. The maintenance stage, on the other 
hand, starts with monitoring, and is followed by rehabilitation and reconstruction. The 
infrastructure management focuses on the second stage of the life cycle as is often called the 
performance monitoring phase. It is a cyclic process where the organizations first monitor the 
condition of the infrastructure and then plan for the repair and rehabilitation, followed by the 
same procedure for the rehabilitated infrastructures. A standard asset management system, 
therefore, aims to provide firm grounds to monitor the infrastructure system, optimize the 
security, upgrades, and timely rehabilitation of facilities through cost-effective management, 
programming, and resource allocation decisions. In other words, it connects the engineering 
principles with rational management exercises and economic theories and renders the tools to 
promote a systematic and logical approach to decision-making. Therefore, a typical 
infrastructure management framework consists of 8 steps, as shown in the figure 1.  
It starts with developing goals and policies, collecting and creating the asset inventory data, 
quantitative condition and performance measures of the assets, economic assessment of trade-
Figure 1: A typical asset/infrastructure management framework 
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offs between alternatives, planning for selecting the options based on the available budget and 
investment strategies, implementing the decisions, and monitoring the performance (FWHA, 
1999). As a result, an infrastructure management system connects the infrastructure database 
with analytical, engineering, and economic methods to make rational, objective-centric, and cost-
effective decisions. 
2.2. Existing Practices in Infrastructure Management  
The array of infrastructure management practices in the industry is massive. While some of the 
organizations still prefer the conventional or ad-hoc approach, others are gradually moving 
towards a strategic asset management approach. The spectrum of strategic asset management 
includes but is not limited to the uses of system dynamics, multi-criteria decision analysis, 
analytical-hierarchical process, decision support system, statistical and mathematical modeling, 
and risk-based approaches. As a result, there has been a significant number of researches 
performed on the mentioned approaches over time, with the ultimate aim of developing an 
effective asset management approach that is reliable, versatile, efficient, and easy to use. 
The conventional asset management practices usually involve a like-for-like or an ad-hoc 
approach. The outcome of such strategies is very parochial as a temporary focus in an issue may 
result in a contrary impact on other operations of other components in a system. Moreover, to 
keep the facilities operating at a required level of safety, serviceability, and maintainability is 
epoch-making, as a disruption in the service of one may have a domino effect over others. In the 
absence of an efficient and effective system, a failure of one asset can lead to significant 
economic, social, and environmental impacts on the entire network. These problems get further 
augmented, particularly in city areas, with increasing MR&R activities due to excessive 
population, utility, and aging infrastructure (Wei et al., 2020). Managing a city's infrastructure 
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network is very strenuous as there lies a list of hurdles associated with it. The first hurdle lies in 
the data collection and compilation process. Here the challenge is that the decision-making 
process requires a variety of data ranging from installation year, utility maps, material type, 
thickness, diameter, construction details, local policies, and so forth, which may not necessarily 
be stored and organized by a single owner/entity. It will not be wrong to say that the available 
data usually are disintegrated, inconsistent, and in an incompatible format. As a result, it 
becomes cumbersome for the decision-makers to make use of it. For example: in a city council, 
the water mains team may use SQL for its assets database, the pavements team may use 
Microsoft Excel, while the IT may automate the database using some intricate programming 
tools. The decision-makers then have to go through the arduous task of firstly getting the relevant 
data and understanding it. Secondly, formatting it into a standard format and ultimately using it 
to plan the asset management.  
The second challenge is that the assets are interdependent among one another (e.g., water 
mains, gas pipelines, telecommunications, power supply, and pavements). To add on, the 
relevant stakeholders plan and execute the MR&R of these assets individually without 
considering their dependencies.  As a result, the maintenance of one infrastructure is likely to 
have an impact on the condition of other infrastructures, causing a stream of problems (Ouyang, 
2014). Rehabilitation activities of the pavements can be an appropriate example for this, as it 
requires working on a section of the road surface, and while doing that, the water and gas 
pipelines, the telecommunication wires, and the power supply lines may face damage or 
disruption. As a result, this ignorance of the interdependencies makes it challenging for 
management to have a holistic view of the impacts of their actions on the other assets. The third 
challenge is to select a particular method/approach which could forecast the performance of the 
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infrastructure over time, predict the consequences of a decision on the infrastructure system, and 
suggest the appropriate measures for it (Wei et al., 2020).  The selection of an approach will 
again require voluminous historical data about the assets, information regarding the potential 
impact on the society, environment, and economy, and the possible cause and likelihood of the 
effects that may not be readily available. In this regard, Hadzilacos et al. (2000) applied the 
historic pipeline failure data in a probabilistic model to design a decision support system that 
enabled the managers in the rehabilitation planning and optimization for the MR&R of pipeline 
networks of water utilities. Fuchs-Hanusch et al. (2008) developed a model to aid the decision-
making for planning the rehabilitation measures in water supply systems using historic pipeline 
characteristics and failure data. The problem with these approaches is that they heavily rely on 
historical data, which may not be available every time. On the other hand, Marlow et al. (2015), 
instead of relying on the historical data, used expert elicitation methods to develop a decision 
support tool that suggested suitable pipeline and pavement rehabilitation techniques. Ter Berg et 
al. (2019) proposed a methodology to access the time required for structural assets to degrade to 
a specific threshold condition using Cooke's model as expert elicitation. Despite avoiding the 
dependency on the historical data, the generalization of these methods is yet to be scrutinized for 
testing and prediction of consequences in infrastructure management. 
Therefore, there is a need for strategic asset management that can account for the hurdles 
discussed above as well as aid the decision-makers to plan when, where, and what assets are 
needed to be maintained. However, it is difficult to accomplish this because, firstly, every asset 
is important in one way or the other, but the conditions governing the failure for these may 
differ. Secondly, there is an issue with the budget as having an unlimited budget is quite 
impossible (Shao and Li, 2007). In this regard, Shao and Li (2007) developed a reliability-based 
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time centric asset management methodology to optimize the risk cost for the assets during their 
service life. The authors developed an algorithm to facilitate the users to determine an optimal 
number of maintenances for break and stratification, which gives the minimum total cost 
required for the asset in their entire lifespan. Nevertheless, the algorithm did not account for the 
various strategic policies and the dynamic relationships between them. 
Strategic policies are considered one of the prominent factors that play a crucial role in 
long-term infrastructure performance. The decision-makers usually go through an intricate task 
of making a selection among all the viable options before making any conclusion. The choices 
include but may not be limited to budget distribution, social and environmental consequences, 
risk appetite, and governmental policies. Furthermore, there may be a dynamic relationship 
between these strategic parameters. For example, a limitation in the budget may directly 
influence the risk appetite of an organization, as the decision-makers might be inclined only 
towards eliminating the risk of those assets having a higher likelihood to fail at present. 
Nevertheless, if there are no constraints on the available funding, they may focus on mitigating 
the risk of all the assets with a high probability of failure in the next few years. In this regard, 
Rashedi and Hegazy (2015) developed a simulation model that allowed the decision-makers to 
examine the effectiveness of the different strategic decision policies. The researchers used the 
system dynamics approach to analyze the interactions and trade-offs among the physical 
condition of infrastructure, life cycle cost of maintaining it to an acceptable condition, backlogs, 
sustainability, and strategic policies of asset managers.  The developed framework used different 
what-if scenarios and provided valuable outcomes for analyzing the long-term performance of an 
infrastructure network with the dynamics among the various attributes of asset management.  
Beheshti and Sægrov (2018) considered the infiltration and inflow reduction, rehabilitation rate, 
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population growth, and energy management as the strategic parameters to analyze their 
interactions for an operative wastewater transport system management. Similarly, Crisp and 
Birtwhistle (2005) developed a methodology to combine the age and condition of the electricity 
transmission assets network that analyzed the effects and interaction of various MR&R scenarios 
on equipment failure rate, asset population, age, and state. The system-dynamics-based works 
show the interactions among the strategic attributes and their effects on the performance of the 
network; however, they lack to account for the uncertainty analysis as a factor for the decision-
making. 
Infrastructure management decisions should also reckon the multiple and conflicting 
criteria/data that are subject to various degrees and kinds of uncertainties along with engineering 
judgments and expert opinions. Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) provides an engineered 
methodology to integrate the different factors (monetary and non-monetary) with benefit/cost 
information for the stakeholder to observe and rank the alternative course of action (Kabir, 
2012). The decision-making process for identifying an optimum strategy using a multi-objective 
decision-making process necessitates optimizing various objectives that are guided by several 
parameters. These parameters include construction costs, future rehabilitation costs, user costs, 
maintenance of traffic, quality of work, safety, impact on surrounding communities and 
businesses, impact on the ecosystems, and so forth (Salem et al., 2013). MDCM methods come 
in very handy for budget and resource allocation. It is a preferred method because when the 
decision-makers tend to allot funds through conducting experts' or engineers' meetings, everyone 
upholds and justify their projects.  Furthermore, the use of the MCDM framework in asset 
management supports the decision-maker to i) rank the performance of alternatives against 
multiple criteria which are generally evaluated in different units; and ii) reflect the trade-offs 
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among multiple differing criteria and quantify the uncertainties essential for comparison of the 
various options (Kiker et al., 2005). However, the MCDM method also has a few limitations 
such as the assumption that the criteria are not correlated, the approach is analogous to the ‘black 
box’ in the cases of complex MCDM methods (i.e., a higher number of measures), and the 
approach typically either exaggerating or undervaluing a certain factor when the chosen criteria 
are either redundant or not comprehensive (Lai et al., 2005).  Similarly, during the fund 
allocation, the ones with the best and loudest arguments get the funds allocated to their project 
resulting in unfair optimization of the resources. Moreover, the use of weights or indexes in 
budget allocation formulas also tends to make the approach unfair and subjective (Lind et al., 
1997). 
Different countries such as Australia, U.K., France, and Germany use scenarios based on 
cost-benefit analysis for the investigation of the effects of risk and uncertainty of project 
investments, which arise from the data, modeling techniques, error in forecasts, and so forth. The 
term “uncertainty” highlights that the decision-makings are usually executed based on deficient 
information about project schemes that are yet to materialize (Walker, 2000). While the 
uncertainties associated with data or modeling techniques are trivial, the risk that arose due to 
social, political, and environmental issues are significant that needs to be addressed and assessed 
(Piyatrapoomi, 2004). The main purpose of a risk-based assessment is to undertake a risk 
prediction assessment to mitigate negative repercussions. Most of the literature on this topic 
defines the term 'risk' as comprising two elements: first, the probability of a negative event 
occurring during an asset's lifetime of operation; second, the implication of a negative event on 
the performance of an asset (Berdica, 2002). The next chapter will be discussing risk, 
uncertainty, and the mitigating measures developed in the field of infrastructure management. 
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3.  RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT 
3.1. What is Risk? 
The term “RISK” is the most vividly used word for expressing something that has exposure to 
danger. Risk entails uncertainty about the effects/impacts of action concerning something that we 
trust, frequently centering on negative, unwanted outcomes. Knowingly or unknowingly, risks 
have always been an integral element of one's life. When it comes to infrastructure management, 
the recent 2020 gas plant explosion in Houston, pipeline blowout in the Port of Corpus Christi in 
2020, the collapse of a truss bridge in Ola, Arkansas in 2019, Florida International University 
pedestrian bridge collapse in 2019, and so forth are some of the good examples of the risk-
related breakdown of the infrastructure facilities. Therefore, various organizations have defined 
risk based on their standards and industry practices. BSI (2010) defined the risk as to the 
combination of exposure (likelihood of threat) and the impact of the threat. The Association of 
Project Management defined the risk as to the combination of the likelihood of occurrence and 
magnitude of the consequence of an event. Similarly, Risk Analysis and Management for Project 
(RAMP) defined the risk as to the probability of change in the occurrence of an event, leading to 
either positive or negative repercussions. While these organizations defined risk in terms of the 
likelihood or probability, ISO (2009) defined risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives of an 
event that causes a positive or negative deviation from the expectation. In general, we can see 
that the definition of risk comprises of two components: the likelihood of an event and the 
repercussions from the event. 
 
Risk = f(Event, Consequence) 
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In other words, the first component constitutes the assessment of risk, while the second is 
mainly focused on its management. But if we closely look into all these definitions, the terms 
like uncertainty, probability, consequence, and event are frequently repeated. Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand these components before defining the term risk.   
3.2. What is Uncertainty? 
Uncertainty is a state of insufficient knowledge about an event that makes it difficult to estimate 
the existing condition, a future outcome, or more than one possible outcome. Uncertainties are of 
two types: aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory, are the ones described as the uncertainties arisen due 
to the variability in repeated experiments, while epistemic is due to a shortage of knowledge or 
only partial information of the events on the part of the observer. Epistemic uncertainty does not 
subsist independent of the observer, hence very subjective (Damnjanovic and Reinschmidt, 
2020). While the aleatory uncertainty cannot be reduced, acquiring more information or 
increasing the precision of the models can reduce the epistemic uncertainty to a significant 
degree. Since, the aleatory uncertainty is connected to the degree of randomness of an event, it is 
non-deterministic. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty, as discussed before, arises mainly 
due to the incapability to precisely forecast the outcome and thus involves a range of possible 
errors. In the field of infrastructure management, these uncertainties arise mainly due to 
randomness, along with these three sources: data collection, performance forecasting or 
modeling techniques, and the discrepancy between the predicted and observed values 
(Piyatrapoomi et al., 2004). 
The error in data collection is more of a systematic error that is primarily related to the 
uncertainties associated with the existing data or historical data. These systematic errors arise 
from the measurement, sampling techniques, or human judgments and usually compensated 
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using proper statistical methods, establishing uniformity in data collection practices, maintaining 
the database records properly.  
The second type of error is the fallacies induced due to the forecasting methods or the 
modeling techniques that deal with the uncertainties associated with the events happening in the 
future. The sources related to this type of error are endless as there lie several assumptions on 
determining any forecasting technique. Assuming a future interest, depreciation, and inflation 
rate while calculating the life cycle cost of infrastructure to select the most cost-effective MR&R 
strategy, approximating the parameters of distribution to predict the reliability of the system 
(e.g., shape and scale parameter for a Weibull distribution), grouping a specific type of assets 
into a category to model the deterioration, and so forth are some of the examples of this type of 
error. While this type of error can be reduced to an extent, absolute certainty cannot be achieved 
no matter how advanced our techniques are because the future is unknown (Piyatrapoomi et al., 
2004).   
The third type of error is the residual error resulting from the discrepancy between the 
model projected and real observed values. The primary reason for this type of error is the 
impossibility of the mathematical models to replicate the perfect scenarios that will happen in the 
real world in the future. The use of statistical distributions to project the economic benefits from 
the MR&R of a pavement section can be the best example of this. No matter how hard we try, 
there always lies an uncertainty in the forecasted AADT, fuel prices, time valuation, and other 






3.3. Assessment of Risk and Uncertainty in Infrastructure Management 
Uncertainty and risk are often interchangeably used by people; however, there is a subtle 
difference between the two terms. The outcome of an event is unknown in the case of risk but, 
the probability distribution governing the outcome is known. Uncertainty, on the other hand, has 
both unknowns. Therefore, risk can be characterized as objective, while uncertainty is subjective. 
For example, suppose on a bet, getting heads on a coin toss wins a person fifty dollars every 
time. Given that the coin used is fair, the decision taken by an individual to accept the bet with 
the knowledge that he has a half chance to win is called risk. However, if the coin is biased, then 
the decision is defined by uncertainty because the individual knows that s/he has a chance to win 
but not exactly by what probability (De Groot and Thurik, 2018). 
The deterioration in the condition of the infrastructures due to factors like a higher utility, 
climate change, loading, weathering factors, and so forth is an ongoing process. However, 
knowledge about the deterioration and its impact on the lifecycle, risks, performance, and cost is 
still lacking completeness. As a result, the quantification of risks due to the deterioration and its 
effective mitigating MR&R gets very complicated (Ter Berg et al., 2019). Therefore, there has 
been a tremendous amount of research done on topics related to risk and uncertainty in 
infrastructure management over the past decades. The analyses of risk and uncertainty include 
the use of qualitative and quantitative methods such as i) knowledge-based or expert-based 
techniques; ii) sensitivity assessment; and iii) probability or mathematical based model 
(Piyatrapoomi et al., 2004). 
Some of the works focused on quantifying the risks are using knowledge-based or expert-
based techniques such as elicitation of expert opinion, case-based reasoning models, 
predetermining the guidelines, scenario analysis, and so forth. The knowledge-based approach, 
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such as scenario assessment, is one of the most common methodologies used to forecast the 
upcoming risk and uncertainty in infrastructure projects (Walker, 2000). The decision-makers 
create a multitude of possible scenarios and look for the possible solutions that minimize it to the 
greatest extent to account for the risks and uncertainties in the future. Techniques such as 
calculating the benefit-cost ratios, assigning weightage, calculating the impacts of risk are 
generally used to score the scenarios and make a conclusion. While this method provides a clear 
picture of the impact of the given scenario on the existing infrastructure system, it does not 
provide any information on the likelihood of the event (Piyatrapoomi et al., 2004). The use of 
what-if scenarios used in the impact analysis to compare the outcomes of different budget 
scenarios for MR&R of a pavement network can be an example of scenario analysis. The 
decision-makers compare the indicators such as the average PCI of the network, the percentage 
of network-miles in good, satisfactory, and poor conditions, and the percentage area of the 
pavement network in different conditions for different budget scenarios. Similarly, in cases 
where multiple assets are linked in a network, asset managers also use techniques like eliciting 
experts' opinions to understand the possible risk and the relevant consequences of their strategies 
before making complex decisions. In this regard, Wei et al. (2020) developed a web-based 
decision support system for asset management by defining a set of rules to show the linkage 
among the assets. The model used the trigger data such as pipe leakage, consequence data such 
as service interruption for the assets, expert judgments to account for the uncertainty in terms of 
qualitative likelihood, and an inference engine to anticipate the consequences of the triggers in 
the assets at a specific location. The findings reveal that this knowledge-based approach to 
integrating multiple assets and process a multitude of data supports a complex-decision process.  
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Similarly, another method of accessing the risk and uncertainty in the infrastructure project is 
using sensitivity analysis. The asset managers use sensitivity analysis before deciding because it 
provides them the degree to which the inputs influence the uncertainty of outcome in the project 
or the condition of the network. As a result, they can invest more time in that factor to minimize 
the potential sources of error.  The World Road Congress Committee on Economics and Finance 
(1983) used sensitivity analysis to investigate the interactions among input variables by creating 
a range of feasible values using observation data and the Delphi technique to understand 
uncertainties in data and forecasting error in the traffic model. The researchers found that the 
error in the modeling techniques contributed significantly to the uncertainty in the project 
compared to other sources of errors. 
Likewise, some of the other works focused on probability or mathematical models are 
based on predefined statistical distributions to determine the failure probability for an 
infrastructure. The probabilistic assessment of risks is a statistical method that accounts for 
overall uncertainties in an infrastructure management project. A probability distribution using the 
statistical parameters is used to model the uncertainties of input variables. The result of the 
analysis is the probability distribution created using the statistical parameters. For example, 
suppose a Cast Iron (CI) pipe has a useful life of 15 years with a coefficient of variation of 20%. 
We can model the failure of the CI pipe using the concept of failure probability by assuming 
various statistical distributions (Normal, Weibull, etc.). 
Assuming the failure follows a normal distribution,  
The density function for the given CI pipe is, 









μ is the expected mean end life of the pipe = 20 years 
σ is the standard deviation in the end life = COV	 × 	µ = 4 
The failure function is determined using, 
 










Assuming the failure follows a Weibull distribution, 
The density function for the given CI pipe is, 
 










‘β’ is the scale factor  
‘η’ is the shape factor 







Figure 2 below shows the forecast of the failure of the CI pipe with an analysis period of 25 




Figure 2: Probability of failure over time for the CI time over 25 years using different distributions 
 
While both the distributions estimate the probability of failure of the CI pipe over 25 
years, the Normal distribution underestimates the failure probability till the time the CI pipe 
reaches its assumed useful end life and then overestimates the failure. On the other hand, it is just 
the opposite using the Weibull distribution. The observed results, nonetheless, can be anywhere 
above, below, or between the two curves. Therefore, for decision-making, the use of probability 
distributions is a feasible tool because the uncertainties associated with the infrastructure data are 
quantified and modeled by a statistical distribution. In that way, it provides the decision-maker 
with the idea regarding the likelihood of that event to occur. However, it does not provide 
absolute certainty on the outcome of the event and varies among the assumed distributions. 
Menendez and Gharaibeh (2017) developed a methodology to account for the uncertainties 
associated with inputs in pavement management by modeling them in terms of probability 




























the cost of MR&R strategies, and performance predictions as the inputs. The study concluded 
that the uncertainties from the prediction models and MR&R costs have a significant effect on 
the network’s performance risks. Similarly, various other probabilistic models such as Markov 
models (Butt et al. 1994; Mishalani and Madanat, 2002; Thompson and Johnson, 2005), survival 
analysis (Gharaibeh and Darter, 2003), and Bayesian models (Liu and Gharaibeh, 2014) are 
widely used to predict the performance transportation assets over time.  
MCDM process, as discussed before, is another approach widely used by researchers for 
the prioritization of assets for replacement. Nordgard and Catrinu (2011) used risk criteria as 
qualitative measures with maintenance and cost as the quantitative measures for the MCDM in 
the field of the electricity distribution system for asset management. de Almeida et al. (2015) 
developed a multi-dimensional quantitative risk prioritization methodology based on multi-
attribute utility theory. Barry et al., (2003) have developed a model that utilized the GPS and GIS 
data managing the roadway system for the Department of Main Roads in Western Australia. The 
system effectively collected and stored data for asset management, works management, and risk 
management. Furthermore, the system used probability-based risk assessments for MR&R and 
capital works using HDM-4 software. Similarly, Ype Wijnia (2011) developed an approach to 
draw a relationship between the risk management process and the need for asset management. 
However, none of them, de Alemdia, Barry, and Wijnia, considered the benefit-cost analysis for 
the decision-making process. On the other hand, Syed and Lawryshyn (2020) developed a risk-
based decision-making framework considering risk evaluation and benefit-cost analysis for asset 
management. The researchers used risk tolerance criteria, benefit-cost analysis, and uncertainty 
reduction metrics as the parameters, along with an analytical hierarchical process matrix for the 
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prioritization of projects at a natural gas compression facility. However, the framework did not 
account for the assets with unique traits.   
Managing the risk for infrastructures such as water mains, lift stations, pavements on a 
facility, as discussed before, requires a failure model. A failure model typically predicts the 
lifetime of an asset that can be used to plan the M&R strategies as well as mitigate the risk. A 
typical failure model is developed using the concept of statistics and probability distributions. 
One of the earliest works on failure prediction models in pipelines was performed by Shamir and 
Howard (1979). The researchers developed a model that connected the number of failures in the 
pipe with their exponent age by dividing them into segments based on their material and 
diameter. Herz (1996) developed a new probability distribution using survival analysis and 
density function to predict the lifetime of a pipe. The researcher also divided the pipes into 
homogenous segments based on the pipe attributes. Black et al. (2005) used a semi-Markovian 
model to develop transitional matrices to evaluate the uncertainty associated with the rate of 
deterioration in water mains.  Similarly, Kulkarni et al., (1986) used Bayesian statistics, 
Gustafson and Clancy (1999) used semi-Markovian analysis to model the failure of the pipeline. 
The researchers divided the pipe segments into homogenous sections based on the pipe attributes 
to model the failure pattern. However, the problem with these approaches is the assumption that 
the failure rate would remain the same in each homogenous group. However, this can lead to 
biases in the prediction (Martins et al., 2013). To overcome the biases, Jeffrey (1985) used the 
Cox model to estimate the Cox parameters in a water network failure data. The author linked the 
bathtub failure effect with the hazard function in the water network. The Cox model uses 
covariates to understand the influence of attributes in the failure instead of segmenting the pipe. 
Moreover, Le Gat (2009) used a counting process to model the failure distribution of pipelines. 
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The author related the rate of failure with the linear function of the number of past failure 
occurrences. These models are then used as a part of a risk management framework to manage, 
forecast, and mitigate the risks associated with the assets’ failure. 
3.4. Risk Management Framework 
Managing the risks is one of the most important goals for any organization. For asset 
management firms, managing the risk by forecasting the exact period when the threshold level of 
service will go below the standards is extremely difficult because of two reasons. First, there are 
uncertainties associated with the parameters in the deterioration process of infrastructure; 
secondly, the lack of historical data on conditions and failures. Furthermore, the management of 
risks is also dependent on the risk appetite of an organization. While some own all the risks, 
some share it, and some delegate all to the third-party. Be it taking, sharing, or transferring, a 
general risk management framework consists of identifying, treating, monitoring, and managing 
the risks. As per the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a risk management 
framework consists of assessment, treatment, monitoring, and communication of the risks. 
Similarly, according to the Society of Risk Analysis (SRA), a typical process of risk 
management comprises assessment, characterization, communication, management, and policy 
development. The Project Management Institute (PMI), on the other hand, considers the 
identification, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, planning for risk response, and 
controlling the risk in a typical risk management process. Therefore, using any risk management 
framework, risk can be defined as the combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of an event 
and its consequence (opportunity or threat) on the event; where the likelihood for an engineering 




Risk	 = 	Hazard	 × 	Vulnerability	 × 	Consequence 
or, 
Risk	 = 	Likelihood	 × 	Consequence 
DNV (2009, 2010) recommended a risk assessment framework for the accidental events 
resulting in a pipeline failure. The framework analyzed risk by evaluating the frequency and 
consequences of accidental events.  The steps for risk assessment in the recommended process 
include a) identification of different risks and types of failures, b) evaluation of failure 
probabilities, c) evaluation of failure the consequences, and d) quantification of risk for the 
evaluation of failure probabilities and consequences. 
An asset management system equipped with an effective risk assessment technique provides 
a foundation for prioritizing the maintenance and rehabilitation of existing assets as well as a 
basis for future inspection of assets with an unknown condition (Syachrani et al., 2011). A failure 
to manage the risks will result in a negative repercussion to maintain the desired level of service 
and asset management. The repercussions include but may not be limited to the following: 
i) A failure to deliver and maintain the required levels of service 
ii) Damage to the reputation of the City 
iii) Damage to the environment 
iv) A sacrifice to the health and safety of personnel involved in managing the assets 
v) Exposure to litigation 
vi) A higher likelihood of backlogs resulting in exceeding budgets 
Therefore, there is a need for a risk management framework that provides a more reliable 
identification of risks, a data-driven basis for decision-making, proactive management, efficient 
allocation, and utilization of resources. The framework should further improve the confidence of 
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the stakeholders as well as be compliant with the policies. The risk management framework 
typically used in the infrastructure management project consists of: 
i. Identification of the Risk 
Typically, a risk identification process in any organization consists of a series of meetings 
and brainstorming sessions over time, keeping all the ideas and viewpoints in regard. A 
few of the common risks in any infrastructure management system are: Political Risk, 
Economic Risk, Social Risk, Cultural Risk, Environmental Risk, Technology Risk, and 
Operational Risk. 
ii. Assessment of the impacts of risk 
The risk assessment consists of analyzing the impacts of risks using qualitative and 
quantitative measures. Qualitative assessment of risk is the subjective examination of the 
risks by assigning a numerical scaling on the basis of their impact. The examples of 
qualitative measures include but are not limited to Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Systems Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), etc.  
The quantitative assessment of risks is the examination of the risks in terms of numerical 
risk values, such as probabilities associated with the event. Typically, it would include 
using simulation tools to categorize risks based on the intensities of impacts and 
probabilities. Quantification of risks is the process of giving a systematic consideration to 
the causes of each type of event and their consequences using numerical weight for 
making the decisions as to what to do about them. The use of numerical weightage 
provides significant insights, scrutiny, and consideration of the upcoming risks. The 
quantification of risk allows an organization to prepare contingencies for the budget, 
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schedule, or human resources such that they could efficiently prioritize them (Duncan, 
2013).  There are several methods proposed by different standards to quantify the risk.  
These methods can be used differently depending on the nature and gravity of the 
influencing factors. Despite helping the decision-makers to plan and analyze the output in 
terms of cost, time, and resources, it is still subjective to an extent on the decision-maker 
as s/he assigns the probability and impacts to quantify the risks. The quantification 
process in all methods involves estimating the risk in terms of some numerical measures 
and the impact that it could mark on the outcomes. The estimation, however, can be 
performed using various approaches such as heuristic models, scenario analysis, 
probability distribution models, mathematical models, and interdependency models. After 
the estimation of risks, a criterion for the likelihood of all the events is defined (ISO 
31000:2009). For example, suppose the probability of occurrence of an event 'A' is 0.1, 
then its likelihood can be assigned based on the expert elicitations or historical data for 
similar events, suppose 2 (on a scale of 1-10).  Likewise, suppose the impact of the event 
'A’ is 7 (on a scale of 1-10) estimated using a similar method. Then the risk due to event 
'A' will be 14. The quantified risks are then evaluated with respect to the defined risk 
matrix.  
A risk matrix is a matrix that is used to assess a particular risk that graphically shows the 
intersection of an event's likelihood and its severity against a predefined criterion. The 
risk matrix provides better visibility of the risks to assist the management in decision 
making by prioritizing the risks identified in a project, denoting the range and scores of 
the risks, and both qualitatively and quantitatively interpreting the risks. A risk matrix 
can be represented both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is represented qualitatively if 
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the probabilities are estimated in terms of the severity of the impact (high-low) and 
quantitatively if both the severity and likelihood are expressed in terms of numbers. The 
Figure 3 below shows an example of a risk matrix (quantitative) where the red zone 
denotes intolerable/unacceptable risks, the orange zone as concerning risks, the yellow 





The values (1, 2, 4,7, and 10) of the likelihood signifies rare (<5% likelihood), unlikely 
(5-15% likelihood), moderately (15-50% likelihood), likely (50-90% likelihood), and 
certain events (>90% likelihood) respectively. Similarly, the values of the consequences 
(bottom-up) denote the severity or impact of the risks as insignificant, minor, moderate, 
major, and catastrophic. The insignificant impact means that the risks are easily mitigated 
by normal day to day process, the minor impacts result in 20% and 10% schedule and 
cost overrun.  Likewise, the moderate impact may increase the cost and schedule by 30%, 
Figure 3: A risk matrix showing the likelihood and consequences of risks 
LIKELIHOOD
1 2 4 7 10







10 VH 10 20 40 70 100
7 H 7 14 28 49 70
4 M 4 8 16 28 40
2 L 2 4 8 14 20
1 VL 1 2 4 7 10
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major by 50%, and catastrophic leading to the abandonment of the project (CBIS, 2016). 
In this project, the risk assessment is performed in terms of the failure probability and the 
consequences of the failure. The quantitative assessment is performed in terms of the 
failure probabilities, which are calculated using the system reliability and point process 
concepts by assuming the useful life distributions of the assets. The qualitative 
assessment of risks is performed in terms of the consequence of failure, which is taken 
from the asset inventory database, which is the maximum score of the Social, Economic, 
and Environmental factors which is discussed further in the next chapters.  
iii. Development of the mitigation strategies 
There are several risk mitigation and treatment strategies used by organizations. While 
developing a M&R plans the most commonly used approach, transferring the risks to the 
third party, establishing a contingency, changing the parameters to avoid the risks, 
creating an optional course of actions, and accepting the risks if no other alternatives are 
applicable, are some other approaches. In this project, replacing the assets with a higher 
yearly benefit to cost ratio is assumed to be the most-effective treatment strategy used for 








3.5. Risk Management using System Reliability and Point Process 
Reliability is the ability of a system or a component to function as anticipation under the given 
constraints of environment and time. It is the likelihood of success at a time 't' usually denoted by 
'R(t)'. Reliability in asset management is one of the essential factors for decision making because 
it is directly related to cost, as the more reliable a system is, the more cost-effective it becomes. 
Mathematically,  





R(t) is the reliability of a system/component,  
f(x) is the failure density function of the system/component 
t is the time 
T is the analysis period 
Reliability as a value is comparatively easy to be represented in an equation, but it is 
impossible to estimate its true extent in practice because of its reliance on more than one 
outcome variable. Reliability process is used in this research to plan, maintain, determine the 
lifecycle cost, and forecast the failure of the assets over the years.  
Component level reliability can be estimated based on the distribution the given dataset 
follows. The most commonly used distributions are Normal, Weibull, Log-Normal, Exponential, 
and Beta. For a two-parameter Weibull distribution, 

















‘β’ is the shape factor  
‘η’ is the scale factor 
‘R(t)’ is the component level reliability 
‘f(t)’ failure density function of a component over time. 
System-level reliability can be estimated based on the reliability-wise configuration of 
the components. The configurations can be as simple as a few components in series or parallel or 
a combination of both. The most commonly used ones are series, parallel, combined series and 
parallel, and k-out-of-n parallel configurations. For a series configuration, the failure of a 
component will result in the failure of the entire system. In contrast, the parallel configuration 
will continue to run until one of its components operates. The k-out-of-n configuration is a 
special case when there is a redundant system. It requires 'k' components to function out of the 
total 'n' parallel components for a successful operation. In other words, a series configuration can 
be termed as an n-out-of-n system, while a parallel configuration can be termed as a 1-out-of-n 
system. 
The Point Process deals with a random collection of points falling in some space where 
each point represents the time or location of an event.  In other words, the point process is the 
phenomenon of an event occurring sporadically. In the point process, the likelihood of the 
occurrence of similar events is triggered or related to past events. For example, a panic buying or 
selling of stocks in one country may lead to similar events at a different county, ultimately 
resulting in a market rise or crash. The stock market crash of 2008 started from the United States 
but gradually covered the entire globe (Chilamkurthy, 2020). If the likelihood of a similar event, 
is increased by a past event, then the event can be categorized as a stochastically inhibited or a 
self-regulating event, else categorized as a stochastically excited or a self-excited event. 
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Nevertheless, if the probability remains unaffected, then the events are modeled as the Poison 
point process. 
The poison point process is also represented as the Counting Process, which is a 
cumulative count of the number of occurrences of an event up to a current time 't' into a system. 
To illustrate the counting process, if 50 market crashes had happened in 1000 days since the 
monitoring period, N (1000) = 50. The counting process defines a function that gives the 




E[N(t + h) − N(t)|H(t)]
∆t  
 where, 
 H(t) is the history of arrivals up to time ‘t’. 
  λ*(t) is the infinitesimal rate at which events are expected to occur around time ‘t’. 
 N (t+h) is the Point Process dependent on the history of the occurrence of event. 
The self-exciting and the self-regulating process can also be defined in terms of the 
conditional intensity function. If the history of arrivals H(t) causes an increase in the value of 
conditional intensity function, then the process is stochastically excited. Similarly, if H(t) causes 
a decrease in the value of λ*(t), then the process is stochastically inhibited (Chilamkurthy, 2020). 
However, when working with the Poison point process, the conditional intensity function is only 
dependent on the information about the current time ‘t’. 
The next chapters will provide a comprehensive overview of the principles, methodology, 
and framework of the risk-based, reliability-centric, cross-asset, multi-objective asset 
management. The proposed methodology will be applied to the assets at the City of Sugarland, 
TX, as a case study, for the practical assessment. 
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4.  METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK 
In the previous chapters, the relevant works on infrastructure management, which is the required 
introduction to basic concepts used in this research, were presented. This chapter builds the 
theoretical building blocks to set hypotheses required to work on the operationalization of the 
proposed model. Furthermore, it also discusses the methodological framework for the proposed 
model. 
4.1. Methodology  
Assets, in general, are typically managed using either an ad-hoc approach or failure prediction 
models. Most of the existing failure prediction model relies on the concept of statistics and 
probability distributions. The models work perfectly for an asset type inside a facility, given they 
are managed separately with a distinguished budget. But when it comes to managing assets of 
different categories, a single model might not necessarily yield useful or any results. For 
example, the water mains typically are managed using statistical models such as the counting 
process, Yule's process, reliability process, and so forth. These models help to forecast the 
lifetime performance, condition, and prioritization of the water mains. On the other hand, 
condition monitoring of the pavements is usually performed using the Pavement Condition Index 
(PCI) approach. The decisions are made by setting threshold PCI values for the pavement 
sections and necessary measures to be taken if it goes below the threshold. If the asset managers 
were to plan the maintenance strategies, then they usually use the benefit to cost ratio approach 
to prioritize the sections for replacement. Similarly, the assets in a Lift Station of a facility are 
scored through the visual inspections of the condition. The scorings are generally backed by the 
expert elicitation/opinion and the previous failure data. Now, suppose a city council is to plan a 
maintenance strategy for the next five years, provided they have funding of a million dollar every 
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year, it becomes burdensome for the decision-makers to select between these assets as they have 
a different unit of measurement. The comparison of water mains with pavements and lift stations 
will be like a comparison of apples with oranges and bananas. Therefore, the methodology and 
framework described in this chapter aims to provide a solution for the asset management 
problem mentioned above. This research paper aims to relate the different asset management 
practices using a risk-based reliability-centric asset management approach. The primary 
objective of using this approach is to define the failure probability of the assets, the associated 
consequence of the failure, and relate it to derive the indirect cost of the asset failure. The 
indirect costs associated with the failure assets allow the decision-maker to visualize the trade-
off between the assets in monetary units. Furthermore, the paper introduces a term called yearly 
Benefit to Cost Prioritization (BCP) number to prioritize the assets for yearly replacement. The 
BCP number is the ratio of the product of the failure probability and the indirect cost of 
replacement of an asset with the direct cost of replacement. It helps the decision-maker to 
compare the benefits of replacing an asset (e.g., water mains) to replacing another asset (e.g., 
pumps) in the same year. 
In this paper, we have divided the assets into two categories: linear assets and point 
assets. A linear asset is an asset whose failure function is governed by its length.  The condition 
and characteristics of such assets can vary between the sections. The length of the linear assets 
directly influences the cost of replacement (both direct and indirect) and the maintenance 
prioritization. Assets like water mains, pavements, railway tracks, power lines, and so forth are 
some of the examples of linear assets. The MR&R strategies of the assets are prioritized by 
dynamically segmenting the network into the group of assets. The groups are divided based on 
common properties such as diameter, material, and age.  
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On the other hand, in point assets, the length of the asset does not influence the failure 
function and the maintenance strategy. Therefore, instead of replacing a part like the linear 
assets, the entire asset is replaced. For example, units of pumps in a lift station are replaced 
compared to replacing a section length of an AC pipe of a specific diameter.  Some of the 
examples of point assets are pumps, SCADA panels, railway switches, and traffic cameras. 
4.1.1. Methodology for Linear Assets 
Linear assets have fixed coordinates (start and endpoints) and are measured in linear units. The 
length can be divided into small homogenous management sections for prioritizing the treatment. 
In this research, we have integrated two concepts of statistics used for modeling the failure 
across the linear assets: the point process and the reliability process. A point process is generally 
used to model the failure of water mains assets such as pipelines. The results from the point 
process work perfectly fine for the network-level analysis of a linear asset; nevertheless, it lags 
when accessing the component level analysis. In other words, the results provide the condition of 
the overall network but do not provide any information regarding the expected number of 
failures in individual sections. Since the primary aim of this project is to create an interface for 
comparing assets of different categories for prioritizing the replacement, the counting process 
modeling falls short under this because it is not used to model the point assets. Therefore, this 
paper uses the concept of reliability process to prioritize the replacement of various assets of 
different kinds.  The reliability process uses the concept of failure probability to plan 
maintenance, determine the life-cycle cost, and forecast the failures. 
For the Point Process, the conditional intensity or the rate of failure function is calculated as: 
λ∗(t) = lim
∆*→0




λ∗(t) = 	 dE(N(t))dt  




where, λ*(t) is the infinitesimal rate at which events are expected to occur around time ‘t’. 
 E(t)	is the expectation of failure at a time 't' 
Λ∗(t) is the cumulative rate of failure. 
Let us consider homogenous sections where expected number of failures follow a 
binomial expectation. The binomial distribution in statistics is the discrete probability 
distribution with two parameters: the number of independent experiments (n), and the probability 
of success in each (p). In the case of a single experiment (n=1), the binomial distribution is also 
called a Bernoulli distribution or trial. The sequence of outcomes of a Bernoulli experiment is 
called a Bernoulli process. 
 Therefore, the failure probability of a section in first year is, 
∫ f(t)dt = F(t = 1) = P1"0   





Consider a 10 miles pipe homogenous section with 10 segments each 1 mile long as 
shown in the figure above. Here, 
Length (L) = 10 miles and number of segments (n) = 10 
Figure 4: Segmentation of a sample 10-mile section 
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Assuming segments are independent, the probability of failure using reliability process in each 
segment is determined by: 




i.e., for each segment in year 1,  F(t = 1) = ∫ f(t)dt"0               (i) 
Expected number of failures in n =10 trails, 
i.e., E(n = 10) = n. F(t)                          (ii) 
 
From Point Process, 
E(Total	Failure	in	10	miles	section) = 1 = ∫ λ∗(t)dt"0 	                      (iii) 
Combining (i), (ii), and (iii), 






i.e., f(t) = 2∗(*)5  
Therefore, the failure density of a section is the ratio of rate of failure by the total number 
of sections. Similarly, the probability of failure ‘F(t)’ of the sections can be determined from the 
rate of failure function.  






4.1.2. Methodology for Point Assets 
Unlike the linear assets, point assets are the size and location-specific assets. They do not require 
segmentation for the treatment prioritization. Nevertheless, they are categorized into groups of 
similar kind and size for studying the failure pattern and prioritizing the treatments. Equipment, 
machines, fleets are some of the examples of point assets. The modeling of point assets is easier 
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compared to the linear assets because the condition function is entirely dependent only on the 
type of asset. For example, all the submersible pumps are designed in such a way by the 
manufacturers that they have a particular pattern of failure over time. This will make it easy for 
the managers to model the submersible pump, predict the condition from the available data, and 
prioritize the treatments. Similar is the case with the bypass pumps, valves, SCADA panels, 
generators, and so forth.  
At times, the current age of an asset maybe two years, however, it may show the failure 
characteristics of the assets that are ten years old or more. Modeling the condition considering 
the current age in this scenario would result in the failure of the asset before the projected time 
leading to several consequences. To resolve that, these assets should be modeled considering 
their behavioral age as the real age. Therefore, in this project, the available condition function of 
the point assets is used to calculate their effective or behavioral age. The effective age is 
assumed to be a function of the Estimated mean Useful Life (EUL) and the Coefficient of 
Variation (CoV). For example, if a SCADA panel installed two years ago shows the failure 
characteristics of the SCADA panels that are ten years old, the effective age of the panel should 
be considered as ten years to forecast its performance over time. 
Assuming the failure pattern is represented best by the Weibull distribution, the values of 
EUL and CoV are then used to estimate the shape (β) and scale (η) parameters of a 2-parameter-
Weibull Distribution. The reasons for using a Weibull over a Normal distribution are that firstly, 
a lack of adequate data (which is very common in asset management) can make a normal 
distribution completely scattered. Secondly, solutions in the Normal distribution ranges from -∞ 
to +∞, whereas the Weibull distribution has closed formed solutions. Additionally, in the 
network level analysis of infrastructure systems, asset managers gradually keep on fixing the 
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problems with the assets resulting in the shifting of the Normal distribution to the upper side. 
Moreover, Weibull distribution is very versatile as it takes the shape of different types of 
distributions based on the value of its shape parameter. Therefore, assuming that the point assets, 
irrespective of their sizes, follow the Weibull distribution, the failure pattern in the assets is 
estimated using a Weibull Conditional Reliability Function.	 
The Probability density function is estimated using: 









The Failure Probability Function is estimated using: 



















where, β and η are the scale and shape parameters of a 2-parameter-Weibull Distribution 
The shape and scale parameters can be estimated from the Variance (Var(X)) and the Mean 
(E(X)) functions using: 





E(X) = ηΓ G1 + 1βH	 
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While some assets fail before the expected life, many go past the expected life. Therefore, we 
have used survival analysis to estimate the reliability of the assets that have survived a certain 
period. For example, assuming a pump has an effective age of 10 years, estimated useful life of 
10 years, and variance 4. We can predict the pump's reliability over time to check what would be 
the optimal replacement time for the pump. However, given that pump has already survived 10 
years, the reliability projection should be based on considering its survival. In this case, the use 
of conditional survival reliability function is used to project the failure of the pump that has 
already gone past 10 years of its life yet has not failed. Figure 5 above shows the reliability R(t) 
and failure probability F(t) function of the pump above motioned in the example. 
In the figure, we can see that the for a new pump, the reliability and the failure probability in the 
10th year will be 0.45 and 0.55, respectively. Given that the pump did not fail, if the decision-
maker fails to account for the survival before the next modeling, s/he would be significantly 












0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Age
Reliability and Failure Probability Functions of a sample pump 
F(t) F(t|10) R(t) R(t|10)
Figure 5: Conditional Reliability and Failure Probability of the sample pump that has survived 10 years. 
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Accounting for the survival, on the other hand, would show that the reliability and the failure 
probability in next year 10 years will be 0.129 and 0.871, respectively, which are significantly 
different than the first values.  
The same thing can also be explained using the probability density function for the pump. 
The figure below shows the probability density function of the sample pump, where the blue line 
‘f(t)’ represents the density function at present. The orange line ‘f(t|10)’ shows the density 
function given that the pump has survived the first 10 years. Since the area under the density 
function should be equal to one, we can see that the area under both curves is 1. 
 
 
4.1.3. Methodology for Cross-Asset Prioritization 
The problem with the existing models used in asset management is that they do not provide any 
comparison between the linear and point assets. While these models perfectly prioritize the 
single-assets sections for maintenance, the output from the single asset models does not provide 










0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Time (years)
Probability Density Functions for the sample pump
f(t) f(t|10)
Figure 6: Probability density function of the sample pump that has survived 10 years. 
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the linear assets and points are calculated in terms of failure probability, thus, referring to cross-
asset maintenance prioritization. However, the probabilities are not directly used to ranks the 
linear and point assets together because there is another factor- the COF associated with asset’s 
failure- which needs equal importance. COF, however, cannot be used alone because they are 
represented in term of the ordinal numbers and does neither account for the probability failure 
nor the monetary consequences. Therefore, we use a yearly Benefit to Cost Prioritization (BCP) 
number to delve into the benefits of replacing particular assets compared to others in a specific 
year in terms of monetary units. The BCP number is a function of the expected monetary 
consequence associated with the asset’s failure Mathematically, 
BCP = f(F(t), COF, Cost) 
where,  
F(t) is the probability of failure over time ‘t’. 
Cost is the direct cost of replacement of the asset.  
COF is the consequence associated with the failure which can be mapped as the indirect cost as 
shown in the table below. 
Table 2: Mapping the COF into Indirect Cost 
Direct Cost COF 
Multiplier Factor 
0.5 1 1.5 2 
Monetary Equivalence 
$5,000.00 
1 $2,500.00 $5,000.00 $7,500.00 $10,000.00 
2 $5,000.00 $10,000.00 $15,000.00 $20,000.00 
3 $7,500.00 $15,000.00 $22,500.00 $30,000.00 
4 $10,000.00 $20,000.00 $30,000.00 $40,000.00 
5 $12,500.00 $25,000.00 $37,500.00 $50,000.00 
 
Direct Consequence = Direct Cost of Replacement (RC) 
Indirect Consequence = Service Interruption Cost (SIC) 
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Total Consequence of Failure ($) = RC+SIC 
Then, 
Expected	Monetary	Consequence = 	F(t) × Cost	of	replacement	per	unit	 × M 
where, M is the multiplier factor used for the COF 
∴ BCP = Expected	Monetary	ConsequenceDirect	Cost	of	Replacement  
Since all the assets inside a facility will have the following: 
i. the consequence associated with its failure 
ii. the probability of failure over time, and  
iii. the cost of replacement 
The use of the BCP number in prioritizations provides us the information regarding the 
benefit (avoidance in paying the expected monetary consequences) if the asset is replaced this 
year then the following years. It also provides a common interface to relate the linear assets with 
the point asset. Furthermore, the risk trade-off between the assets can also be expressed in terms 
of dollars. 
At this point, a comparison of the reliabilities or failure probabilities of the assets with the 
threshold values is beyond the scope of this research. This is because, firstly, it is extremely 
difficult to define the comparison indexes as the threshold values of reliabilities would require a 
meticulous 'calibration' procedure. The threshold values are usually determined based on the 
calculated reliabilities of the new or well-performing existing assets (Melchers, 1999). Secondly, 
the values of threshold reliabilities may differ from asset to asset or organization to organization 
as these values are the functions of material type, utility, probability models, mode of failure, and 




4.1.4. Clustering the sections for developing yearly projects 
Clustering is an approach of segregating the groups with similar data characteristics and allotting 
them into the same group using clustering algorithms. A clustering method is an unsupervised 
learning method as we do not define a set of the predictor to predict the outcome of the target 
variables. Supervised learning has a set of predefined rules that will assign the result of a 
variable. An example of supervised learning is the fixed requirement to score at least 90 in a 
class to get a grade ‘A’. The logic is pretty simple that if a student scores above 90, then s/he will 
get ‘A’. Moreover, the grading requirement is valid across all the classes. On the other hand, 
dividing the students into five groups based on their height is an example of unsupervised 
learning. Here, the groups will be divided based on the heights of students in a particular class as 
there is no fixed set of rules to divide the groups. The mean height of each group can be different 
from class to class.  
Generally, in infrastructure management, the sections identified for replacement are 
determined based on their yearly benefit to cost ratio. However, the retrieved sections may not be 
necessarily located in the same area in a specific year. Economically it does not make sense to 
work in the same location every other year. What makes sense is to group the sections based on 
their similar traits into different maintenance projects and work on them. Therefore, in this 
project, we have used two types of clustering approaches to group the sections into yearly 
maintenance projects. The two types of clustering approaches are asset-based clustering and 
location-based clustering approach. 
i) Asset-based Cluster 
The asset-based clustering approach groups the common asset type into one cluster. This 
approach does not require any mathematical formula to form a cluster. For example, 
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suppose a three-year maintenance plan has identified four AC pipes, three PVC pipes, 
and six pumps to be replaced in random order. The asset-based clustering segregates all 
the ACs, PVCs, and pumps into three different groups. Then assets in a particular group 
will be replaced in the first year, followed by other groups. The replacement year of the 
group will be determined based on the average BCP number of all the assets in that group 
to ensure the maximization of the benefit or the minimization of the expected 
consequences. The primary reason for doing an asset-based clustering is to provide 
flexibility to the managers to find a contractor who provides the best offer for the 
maintenance of a particular group and replace/maintain it. 
 
ii) Location-based Cluster 
A location-based clustering segregates the spatial data of the assets into groups in such a 
way that the assets in the vicinity lie in the same group. A location-based clustering can 
be performed using any of these four types of clustering algorithms: partitioning method, 
hierarchical method, density-based method, and grid-based method (Han et al., 2001). In 
a partitioning method, the (N) number of data is divided into user-specified k-parts, 
where each part represents a cluster. In hierarchical clustering, each data set initially has 
its cluster, which is merged with others moving along the hierarchy. For example, the 
files and folders are stored on our local drive. While the density-based clustering groups 
the dataset based on the distribution and concentration of the data, the grid-based 
clustering algorithm divides the dataset into a grid-like structure with cells to form the 
cluster around the cells. In this project, we use a partitioning method called K-means for 
segregating the sections into clusters based on their geographic coordinates. 
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K-means clustering is a centroid based approach to partition the dataset, where k is the 
number of user-specified centroids or the division, and means is the averaging method to 
determine the location of the centroid. In K-means method: 
• The clusters are calculated as the sum of squared distances Euclidean distances 
between items and the corresponding centroid: 
W(C8) = o (x9 − µ8)#
%$∈;%
 
where, x9 is a data point belonging to the Cluster C8 
µ8 is the mean value of the point assigned to the cluster C8 
• Each observation x9 is assigned to a given cluster such that the sum of squares 
distance of the observation to their assigned cluster centers  µ8 is minimized. 
4.2. Framework for the proposed methodology 
The figure below shows the framework of the risk-based multi-objective cross-asset budget 
allocation framework for holistic asset management. In the research, considering the concept of 
FWHA's pavement management framework, we have divided the process of holistic asset 
management into five groups: data collection, modeling, analysis, construction, and monitoring.  
i) Data Collection: Data collection in the framework is the process of integrating the asset 
data into a relational database. The data includes information regarding inventory, 
location, usage, condition, construction, work history, and design.  
ii) Modeling: The modeling process deals with using the discussed methodology for the 
linear and point assets to calculate and forecast their reliability or failure probability over 
time. The modeling process begins with using the condition function for the assets in the 
database (developing if unavailable) to project the condition over time. The condition 
function allows a decision-maker to evaluate the EUL and RUL of an asset. The 
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condition function linked with the failure functions as discussed in the methodology 
examines the probability of failure of an asset over time.  
iii) Analysis: The analysis process mainly focuses on developing a common interface for 
comparing assets for replacement prioritization. The interface here is in terms of the BCP 
number. The sections then get prioritized for maintenance based on the available budget 
and the performance goals. The budget and the performance goals specified during the 
modeling process can be changed as per the availability and needs.   
iv) Construction: The construction process involves the development of yearly projects and 
implementing them to monitor the outcomes. The projects are developed by clustering 
the sections identified for the maintenance based on their spatial location or asset type.  
v) Monitoring: In the monitoring process, the city council or the asset managers compare the 
results of using the integrated asset management models with their performance goals and 
provide feedback. In the worst case, if the actual performance does not meet the threshold 
standards, the two possible solutions are either to increase the funding or to lower the 
threshold, or both. In general, the monitoring process involves accessing: 
i. An increment in component level average reliability (Point Assets) 
ii. A decrement in network level number of failures (Linear Assets)  
iii. A decrement in number of assets in Very High- and High-Risk Category 





The above-described risk-based multi-criteria cross-asset framework is applied to the 
existing asset database at the City of Sugarland, TX. The case study along with the results are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Figure 7: Framework of the proposed risk-based multi-criteria cross-asset budget allocation model 
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4.3. System Architecture and Flow Model 
The system architecture defines the arrangement, behavior, and structure of the model. The 
figure below shows the pictographic representation of the system architecture of the integrated 
asset management system model. 
 
There are two types of input to the model, the asset inventory database or the results from the 
single-asset management models. In the first case, the entire asset database is considered, 
modeled, and the assets with higher yearly BCP number are prioritized for the replacement. In 
the second case, the output from the single-asset models, i.e., the list of sections to be replaced 
each year along with their condition function are imported into the proposed model. The model 
then calculates the yearly benefit to cost prioritization number for the imported sections based on 
whether they belong to a linear or a point asset category. The model ultimately provides the 
decision-maker with a list of assets (cross-assets) to be replaced every year. The next chapter 
discusses the model in detail using a case study, where the model was applied to the existing 
asset database at the City of Sugar Land, TX. 
Figure 8: System Architecture for the proposed model 
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5.  CASE STUDY - ASSET MANAGEMENT AT THE CITY OF SUGAR 
LAND, TX 
5.1. Overview of the assets, their types, and their conditions 
The City of Sugar Land is the largest city in Fort Bend County, TX, located 19 miles southwest 
of downtown Houston. Being one of the fastest-growing cities in Texas, the maintenance of 
existing infrastructures along with the provision for the development of new infrastructures are 
amongst the city's top priority. Currently, the City of Sugarland has nine different infrastructure 
facilities: Water, Wastewater, Mobility, Drainage & Stormwater Management, Facilities, Fleets, 
Parks & Recreation, Aviation, and Information Technology. As per the 2018 State of the 
Infrastructure Report provided by the City of Sugar Land, the overall condition of the City’s 
assets is “good to fair”. The table 3 below shows the overall condition of the assets at the City of 
Sugar Land, TX.  
 
Table 3: City of Sugar Land’s Overall Assets Ratings 
Condition Percentage of Total Assets 




Very Poor 6 
 
While the table above showed the overall condition of the City’s infrastructure, the table 
4 below show the overall condition of each infrastructure facilities at the City of Sugar Land, 




Table 4: Overall condition of the infrastructure facilities at the City of Sugar Land 
Assets \ Condition A B C D F 
Water 27% 44% 14% 8% 6% 
Wastewater 17% 44% 28% 9% 2% 
Mobility 36% 29% 16% 11% 9% 
Drainage & Storm Water 13% 27% 43% 14% 3% 
Facilities 0% 46% 39% 1% 14% 
Fleet 31% 13% 32% 16% 8% 
Parks & Recreation 31% 36% 27% 5% 1% 
Aviation 8% 11% 30% 50% 1% 
Information Technology 13% 43% 11% 6% 27% 
 
Currently, these nine facilities are managed individually, which is creating a problem for 
cross-asset budget allocation and decision-making for the city council. Moreover, each of the 
assets within the facilities is managed using different practices of asset management. For 
example, the water mains are managed using a proprietary model that works on the point process 
to forecast the failure, whereas the lift stations are managed using another proprietary model that 
evaluates the failure from the visual inspections. The failure condition is the scaled to the ordinal 
numbers (1-5) to evaluate the risk in both water mains and lift stations. The risk is calculated as 
the product of likelihood (ordinal numbering of the condition) and consequence (ordinal numbers 
derived from the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) approach). However, there lies a problem when 
comparing the risks of these assets for prioritization as they are not derived using a common 
approach. Therefore, the developed methodology is applied to the City's asset database to 
manage the resources, expenditures, and priorities to achieve the threshold levels of service and 




5.2. Existing asset management practices at the City of Sugar Land, TX 
The city of Sugar Land currently uses a risk-driven approach to manage the risks and prioritize 
the maintenance of individual asset types. The risk is calculated using a risk matrix derived from 
the likelihood and consequence of failure associated with the assets. The consequence of failure 
is calculated using a Triple Bottom Line (TBL) approach. The TBL approach considers the 
following factors to analyze the consequence.  
i) Social Factors: The social factors deal with the impact of the asset failure associated with the 
consumers and stakeholders. These include: 
a. Health and Safety 
b. Operational Impacts 
c. Service 
d. Reputation 
e. Third-Party Damage 
ii) Economic Factors: The economic factors deal with the threat associated cost of operation and 
maintenance of the assets. These include: 
a. Organizational Objectives 
b. Financial 
c. Systems, Information, and Data 
iii) Environmental Factors: The environmental factors deal with the violations associated with 
regulatory needs such as permits, and non-regulatory needs such as degradation of 
environment. These include: 
a. Regulatory Compliance 
b. Non-Regulatory Compliance 
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The assets are visually monitored and numerically scored for each factor on a scale of (1-
5) based on their severity to determine the consequence. The highest score among all the 
factors is considered as the COF associated with the failure of the asset. The table below 
shows the subjective scoring based on the level of severity. 
Table 5: Numerical Scoring for the consequence of failure based on the severity 
Severity COF Score 




Very High 5 
 
The likelihood of failure is determined by the condition of the asset. However, the 
methodology to estimate the condition varies from asset to asset. For example, the condition of 
water mains is evaluated using a proprietary model that relies on the principle of the counting 
process. On the other hand, the condition of assets in the lift stations are visually inspected based 
on the predetermined factors. 
5.2.1. Existing asset management practice for the Water Mains 
The water main at the City of Sugarland consists of a total of six types of pipes with a total 
length of 650 miles. The table 6 and 7 below show the overall layout of the different types of 
pipes in the city. 
Table 6: Overview of the water mains in the City of Sugar Land 
Material Length (mi) Description 
AC 155.569242 Asbestos Concrete Pipes 
PVC 481.029518 Poly Vinyl Chloride Pipes 
CI 12.6345376 Cast Iron Pipes 
DIP 0.63498793 Ductile Iron Pipes 
STL 0.29183299 Steel Pipes 
Total 650.160654  
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Table 7: Overview of the diameter and total length of the water mains in the City of Sugar Land 
Diameter (in) Count Length (mi) 
1 39 1.31555913 
2 100 1.66765439 
3 59 1.16884134 
4 2227 32.1747162 
5 1 0.13815543 
6 11745 95.7213998 
8 14255 337.307816 
10 159 3.2287126 
12 4179 137.757171 
13 2 0.00188265 
14 4 0.03899858 
16 466 17.7692482 
18 7 0.55397109 
20 165 5.71223396 
24 246 9.94035702 
30 49 1.21481389 
36 79 4.44912225 
Total 33782 650.160654 
 
Water Mains are primarily managed using a risk-based maintenance approach. The 
sections with the highest risk are prioritized for a replacement earlier than the other, based on a 
specified budget scenario. The risks are evaluated as a function of likelihood and consequence of 
failure. While the consequence of failure for the pipe is evaluated using the TBL approach, the 
likelihood of failure is examined using the pipe characteristics and break history. The TBL 
approach considers the social, environmental, and economic impacts associated with the pipe 
failures. The risk is then calculated as the product of likelihood and consequence. 
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5.2.1.1. Evaluation of the Consequence of Failure 
The consequence of failure is evaluated using a numerical scoring (1 to 5) based on the pipe 
attributes, pipe location, and customers served. The table below shows the factors, their scope, 
and their measurement used for evaluating the consequence in a TBL approach. 
Table 8: Factors considered in Triple Bottom Line approach (Sugarland Proprietary Model) 
Category Scope Typical Measures 
Economic 
Direct costs to Sugar Land for 
repairs or other operational costs 
Pipe Diameter 
Pipe Service (WTP feeds) 
Social 
Impacts to Customers 
Critical customers 
Type of users - zoning 
Impacts to other infrastructure Adjacency to roads (by type), rail 
Environmental 
Regulatory compliance Permit violations 
Non-Regulatory impacts 
Non-regulated degradation (water bodies 
and environmentally sensitive lands) 
 
The table 8 above shows an overview of the factors considered while evaluating the 
consequence of failure. The highest value among the factors is considered as the consequence of 
failure for that section. The table 9 below shows the scoring criteria for each factor.  
Table 9: Scoring Criteria for evaluating the COF in Water Mains (Sugarland Proprietary Model) 
 
Category Criteria Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
Economic Direct Cost to Sugarland 
Diameter <=8” 10-16” 18-24” 30” 36” 






Depth NA NA NA >=10’ NA 








Table 9: Continued 
 
For example, 8” Water Main within 50 feet of a major road, and water body 
Category Scores from the table above: 
Economic COF = 1 (diameter), Social COF = 3 (roadways), Environmental COF = 3 (discharge) 
Final COF = 3 
5.2.1.2. Evaluation of the Likelihood of Failure 
The likelihood of failure scoring is based upon the evaluation of the pipe functionality examined 
through the break analysis and pipe characteristics. The break analysis is conducted using the 
condition function from a proprietary model provided by the City of Sugar Land. The projected 





















































 NA NA Within 50 ft Crossing 
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history. The table10 below shows the break equations and the parameters provided by the 
proprietary model for the various pipe categories at Sugar Land.  
 
Table 10: Break equations and parameters for Water Mains 
Pipe 
Category Diameter Break equation Constant Slope 
AC upto 12 in. 
Break	rate
= constant	 × 	e(<=>?@×	CD@) 
8 0.0384 
AC > 12 in. 2 0.0527 
PVC upto 12 in. 2 0.0527 
PVC > 12 in. 2 0.04611 
CI all 3 0.04104 
DIP all 3 0.04104 
STL all 3 0.04104 
 
The break rate obtained from the pipe degradation equation is evaluated against the 
condition score where 1 represents an excellent condition and 5 represents a failure condition. 
The table below shows the city’s scoring for the break rate. 
 
Table 11: Break rate to condition score conversion 
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 
Break Rate (per 100 miles per year) <15 15 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 >60 
 
In addition to the condition score, two more parameters are considered to evaluate the 
LOF scoring for the water mains. The two parameters are the break history and the capacity of 
the asset. The water mains with a history of break gets a score of 1, and others get 0. Similarly, 
based on the hydraulic needs data, the sections that need upsize are given one point. Therefore, 
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the likelihood of failure is the function of condition, break history and capacity. For example, an 
AC pipe with a current break rate of 43 breaks/100miles/ year, no previous break history, and 
does not need an upgrade in size will have a LOF of 3. 
5.2.2. Existing asset management practice for the Lift Stations 
Lift stations fall under the group of Wastewater collection infrastructures. There is a total of 133 
lift stations located at various areas in the City of Sugar Land. The lift station consists of a total 
of 14 different types of assets. The table below shows the overall layout of the different types of 
assets of lift stations in the city. 
 
Table 12: Overview of the lift station assets in the City of Sugar Land 
Asset Count 
Stationary Bypass Pump 31 
Controls 133 
Grounds 134 
Wet Wells 134 




Generator ATS 6 
Submersible Pump 265 
Sub Grinder Pump 17 
Self-Priming Pump 2 
Blower 2 
Portable Bypass Pump 1 
 
Assets in the lift stations are primarily managed using a risk-based approach. Like the 
water mains, the assets with the highest risk are prioritized for replacement, based on a specified 
budget scenario. The risks are evaluated as a function of LOF and COF. The consequence of 
failure for the assets is evaluated using the TBL approach similar to the water mains but with 
different parameters. The likelihood of failure is examined using the condition of the assets. The 
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condition score for an asset is a function of the mortality and other failure modes. While 
mortality refers to the current state of operation, other failure modes refer to the current and 
future operational requirements of the city.  The risk is then calculated as the product of 
likelihood and consequence. 
5.2.2.1. Evaluation of the Consequence of failure 
The consequence of failure is the assessment of the criticality of the asset. It answers the 
question of how critical the failure of the asset is to the city. The COF is evaluated considering 
the triple bottom line impacts of asset failure that includes social, economic, and environmental 
factors. The typical criteria against which these factors are scored are operation   & maintenance 
costs, disruption in the service, health & safety of the workers, regulatory compliance, and 
environmental impacts.  The COF evaluation considers the magnitude of impacts in each TBL 
category on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is very low, and 5 is very high. The final COF for the asset 
is the maximum overall score of the average of the highest score in each TBL category. The table 
below show the scoring criteria for evaluating the COF for the lift station assets. Suppose a 
SCADA panel, located within 150 feet of the commercial center, has a replacement cost of 
'$30000' with no staffing impact on the operation and maintenance and no environmental 
impacts. Then, category Scores from the table below: 
Economic COF = 1 (Replacement Cost), Social COF = 3 (Health & Safety Severity), 
Environmental COF = 1 (discharge) 





Table 13: Scoring Criteria for evaluating the COF in Lift Station Assets (City of Sugar Land) 











































































NA NA Within 50’ of a water body 
Adjacent 













The figure below shows the distribution of the consequence of failure of all the assets in 
the lift station.  
 
5.2.2.2. Evaluation of the Likelihood of failure 
The likelihood of failure for the assets in the lift stations is evaluated against the different modes 
of failures such as mortality, capacity, level of service, and efficiency. The failure modes are 
divided into two categories: physical and the performance condition of the assets. These 
conditions are examined using asset data (such as maintenance history, operating records, 
previous test results), or visual inspections (by defining a set of scoring criteria), or non-
destructive testing methods to estimate the condition of the assets. The table below provides an 
overview of the failure modes and their assessment techniques that are used in estimating the 


































Figure 9: Distribution of the consequence of failure of all the assets in the lift stations 
 65 
 









Current state of repair and operation as 
influenced by age, historical maintenance 




Capacity Does not meet demand (flow, loading, storage volume, etc.) Data, Test 
Level of 
Service 
Does not meet functional needs (regulatory, 
customer requirements, resilience) Data 
Efficiency Not lowest cost alternative (chemicals, power, labor, reliability, parts availability) Data 
 
The physical and performance condition is scored on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents 
is an excellent condition, and 5 represents a failure condition. The tables below show the 
description of the scoring for the physical and performance condition. 
 




Fully operable, well maintained, and consistent with current standards.  Little 
wear shown and no further action required. 
2 – Good 
Sound and well maintained but may be showing slight signs of early 
wear.  Delivering full efficiency with little or no performance deterioration.  Only 
minor renewal or rehabilitation may be needed in the near term. 
3 - 
Moderate 
Functionally sound and acceptable and showing normal signs of wear.  May have 
minor failures or diminished efficiency with some performance deterioration or 
increase in maintenance cost.  Moderate renewal or rehabilitation needed in near 
term. 
4 - Poor 
Functions but requires a high level of maintenance to remain operational.  Shows 
abnormal wear and is likely to cause significant performance deterioration in the 




Table 15: Continued 
 





Meets all design and legal/regulatory requirements in all demand conditions - i.e., 
capacity exceeds maximum designed flow and adequate standby or emergency 
protection provided.  Overall performance excellent and meets all expected future 
requirements. 
2 – Good 
Meets all design and legal/regulatory requirements.  May have minor risk under 




Current performance is acceptable but would likely not meet future additional 
requirements or increased demand (e.g., capacity, level of service goals, 
regulatory requirements, reliability, obsolescence). 
4 - Poor 
Current performance is marginal and will not meet future additional requirements 
or increased demand (e.g., capacity, level of service goals, regulatory 
requirements, reliability, obsolescence). 
5 – Very 
Poor 
Current performance unacceptable and does not meet currently required 
performance criteria (e.g., capacity, level of service goals, regulatory 
requirements, reliability, obsolescence). 
 
The final score of LOF is calculated as the maximum of physical or performance 
condition. For example, a SCADA panel has the following scores: mortality 3, obsolescence 2, 
reliability 3, capacity 4, operation & maintenance issues 3, and regulatory 2. From this data, the 
physical condition score is 3, the performance condition score is 4, and the final LOF is 4. The 






Effective life exceeded and/or excessive maintenance cost incurred.  A high risk of 
breakdown or imminent failure with serious impact on performance.  No additional 













































Figure 10: Distribution of the likelihood of failure of all the assets in the lift stations 
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5.3. Problems with the existing asset management practices at the City of Sugar Land, 
TX 
 
The infrastructures in the City of Sugar Land do not have the same monitoring, failure, and 
maintenance conditions. The city currently uses a multitude of proprietary models provided by 
various consultancies for asset management. While all the models use the city's asset database to 
map it with the condition function to provide the list of assets for MR&R for a given budget 
scenario, the models are asset-specific, i.e., the model working for the Water Mains does not 
work for other assets. The MR&R prioritization is based on the risk-based approach, where the 
assets with higher risk values will be treated earlier than others. However, for integrated asset 
management, the values of risks between assets in different facilities are not comparable. In other 
words, a risk value of 10 in water mains may be more or less severe than the same value of risk 
in the lift stations. Furthermore, in the current models, despite using a risk-based asset 
management approach, the value of risk does not provide the expected monetary consequences 
for asset failure and the benefit of their replacement, which gives rise to the demand for an 
integrated asset management model. The proposed model compares risk between the assets in 
terms of their yearly BCP number and the benefit of their replacement in terms of the decrease in 
the expected monetary consequences. For example: Suppose, an asset has the failure probability 
or LOF in the first year = 0.1, COF = 5, and cost of replacement = $5. Then, the benefit is 
replacing the asset with $0.25 expected monetary consequence in the first year rather than $25 
when it completely fails. 
The proposed model will consider the output from asset-specific proprietary models as the 
input, if available, if not then the existing asset database to retrieve a yearly cross-asset MR&R 
treatment plan for a specified budget.  The designed model will consider the input as follows:     
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i) Sections identified by the asset-specific proprietary models for the respective asset types, 
if available; if not, the asset inventory database (Path II as shown in the Figure 8). The 
inputs are completely dependent on the decision maker as s/he may disregard the results 
from the proprietary models and instead use the entire asset database (Path I as shown in 
the Figure 8). 
ii) The condition function for each asset to calculate the yearly failure probability.  
iii) Yearly funding available for the treatment of sections 
5.4. Application of the model in the City’s asset database 
5.4.1. Modeling the linear assets 
Data Available from the City’s Water Mains database: 
i) Break Rate Equation (Rate of Failure Function) for different Cohorts. 
ii) The Age, Material, Diameter, Length, and Cost of replacement of various assets in the 
Water Mains. 
iii) The Consequence of Failure (COF) for various Water Main Assets. 
The given condition function for the water mains is: 












s g(t)= a. e!	×	$ 
Figure 11: Expected Condition Function for Water Mains 
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i.e, g(t) = a. eE	×	* 
where,  
t = initial age of the pipe 
T = analysis period (10 years) 
g(t) = expected condition performance  
          function (rate of failures per year) 
Linearizing the condition function as shown in figure 12, 
λ"(t0) = g(t0) 
λ#(t0 + T) =
g(t0 + T) − g(t0)
T  
f(x) = g(t0) + q
g(t0 + T) − g(t0)
T r × x 
which is in the form of:  
f(x) = λ" + λ#x 
Therefore,  
F(x) = ∫ (λ" + λ#x)dx	6*F0  is the probability of failure F(t). 
From the equation above, the probability of failure is a function of age and the length of 
the pipes. However, the length of segments in water mains ranges from 1 ft. to 8000 ft. If the 
failure probability for the segments is calculated using this actual length, the segments with 
lengths in hundreds and thousands will have a high probability of failure, and the sections with 
the length in tens or unit digits of feet will have an extremely low probability of failure, 
irrespective of the age. Therefore, the failure probability is calculated by dividing the pipes into 
homogenous sections of length 1000 ft., where the expected number of failures is the binomial 
expectation. The expectation is based on the assumption that the expected number of failures for 
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1000 ft. should be the same as the sum of the expected number of failures of many smaller 
sections adding to 1000 ft. 
The table below shows the calculation of expected number of failures in a sample 8 in. 
diameter AC pipes with total length 1320.8 ft. in the 10th year. The break rate is calculated using 
the condition function used by the city for AC pipes. The constants λ1 and λ2 are calculated by 
linearizing the break rate function. The failure probability and the expected number of failures 
are calculated assuming each segment to behave as a 1000ft. homogenous sections.  
 
Table 17: Calculation of expected failure in sample AC pipes in 10th year 




λ1 λ2 F(10) E(f) 
39 8 AC 412.97 8 0.0384 35.768 52.512 0.068 0.003 0.836 0.345 
39 8 AC 163.79 8 0.0384 35.768 52.512 0.068 0.003 0.836 0.137 
33 8 AC 341.19 8 0.0384 28.407 41.706 0.054 0.003 0.664 0.227 
38 8 AC 220.47 8 0.0384 34.420 50.534 0.065 0.003 0.804 0.177 
39 8 AC 161.30 8 0.0384 35.768 52.512 0.068 0.003 0.836 0.135 
36 8 AC 21.07 8 0.0384 31.876 46.798 0.060 0.003 0.745 0.016 
Tot.   1320.8        1.037 
 
The expected number of failures in each section is the product of its length and the 
respective failure probability in that particular year. The total expected number of failures is the 
sum of expected failures in each section in a particular year. From the table we can see that the 
total expected number of failures in the network of sample AC pipe is 1.037 per 1000 ft. in the 
10th year. The tables below show the yearly total expected cumulative and annual failures per 





Table 18: Expected Cumulative Failures over 10 years in the Water Mains network 
Year Expected Cumulative failures per 1000 ft. AC PVC CI DIP STL Total 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 57.09371 32.25267 2.189001 4.79E-02 1.95E-02 91.6028 
2 116.8055 66.66814 4.502555 9.86E-02 4.01E-02 188.1148 
3 179.1352 103.2464 6.940663 0.151915 6.18E-02 289.5361 
4 244.0831 141.9875 9.503324 0.208006 8.47E-02 395.8665 
5 311.6489 182.8913 12.19054 0.266823 0.108601 507.1062 
6 381.8328 225.958 15.00231 0.328366 0.13365 623.2551 
7 454.6347 271.1874 17.93863 0.392635 0.159809 744.3133 
8 530.0547 318.5797 20.9995 0.459631 0.187077 870.2806 
9 608.0927 368.1347 24.18493 0.529352 0.215455 1001.157 
10 688.7487 419.8526 27.49491 0.6018 0.244943 1136.943 
 
Table 19: Expected Annual Failures over 10 years in the Water Mains network 
Year Expected Annual failures per 1000 ft. AC PVC CI DIP STL Total 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 57.09371 32.25267 2.189001 4.79E-02 1.95E-02 91.6028 
2 59.71175 34.41547 2.313554 5.06E-02 2.06E-02 96.51202 
3 62.32978 36.57827 2.438108 0.053365 2.17E-02 101.4212 
4 64.94782 38.74106 2.562661 0.056091 2.28E-02 106.3305 
5 67.56586 40.90386 2.687215 0.058817 0.023939 111.2397 
6 70.18389 43.06666 2.811768 0.061543 0.025049 116.1489 
7 72.80193 45.22946 2.936322 0.064269 0.026159 121.0581 
8 75.41997 47.39225 3.060875 0.066995 0.027268 125.9674 
9 78.038 49.55505 3.185428 0.069722 0.028378 130.8766 
10 80.65604 51.71785 3.309982 0.072448 0.029487 135.7858 
 
5.4.2. Modeling the point assets 
Data available from the City’s database: 
i) The age, type, size, and cost of replacement of various assets in the lift stations. 
ii) The condition functions for various assets in the lift stations. 
iii) The COF and LOF for the assets in the lift stations. 
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The effective age of assets in the lift station is based on the condition equation used by the city. 
The condition equation below, provided by the city, evaluates the LOF for the assets which is 
used to evaluate their effective age. 
Condition = (slope × age) − Y	intercept 
 
Table 20: Condition score and their description 
Condition Description 
1 Very Good 
2 Minor Defects only 
3 Maintenance Required 
4 Requires Repair 
5 Asset Unserviceable 
 
The table below shows the condition equation and the parameters used by the city for the 
various assets in the lift station.  
 
 
Table 21: Parameters of condition equation for the Lift Station assets 
Asset EUL Y-Intercept Slope Condition equation 
Odor Control 10 1 0.4 
Condition
= (slope × age)
− Y	intercept  
Portable Bypass Pump 10 1 0.4 
SCADA 10 1 0.4 
Grounds 15 1 0.26667 
Pipes 15 1 0.26667 
Valves 15 1 0.26667 
Blowers 20 1 0.2 
Controls 20 1 0.2 
Generators ATS 20 1 0.2 
Stationary Bypass Pump 20 1 0.2 
Sub Grinder Pump 20 1 0.2 
Submersible Pump 20 1 0.2 
Self-Priming Pump 25 1 0.16 
Wet Wells 25 1 0.16 
The effective age for the asset is calculated by plotting the condition curve for the asset 
with condition in Y- axis and Age in X- axis, followed by projecting a straight line from the LOF 





Figure 12: Condition projection curve for the assets in the lift station 
From the figure, the effective age of the grinder pump, stationary bypass pump, and self-
priming pump with the likelihood of failure 2 are 15, 12, and 19 years, respectively. 
The table below provides similar examples of the calculation of effective age of the assets from 
the condition curve and likelihood of failure. 
Table 22: Calculation of the effective age using the condition equation 
Asset Type Condition (LOF) Effective Age (years) 
Grinder Pump 2 15 
Grinder Pump 3 20 
S. Bypass Pump 2 12 
S. Bypass Pump 3 15 
Self-Priming Pump 2 19 
Self-Priming Pump 3 25 
 
The failure prediction of the assets in the lift station is evaluated using a 2-parameter 
Weibull distribution. Failure is a function of the shape (β) and the scale (η) parameters, which 
















Condition Projection Curve for various Assets in Lift Station
Self Priming Pump Stationary Bypass Pump Grinder Pump
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coefficient of variation for all the assets is assumed to be 20%. The table below provides the 
effective age of the assets based on their likelihood of failure.  
 
Table 23: Effective Age of the assets based on the LOF 







































The EUL and COV of the assets are used to estimate the parameters of the 2-parameter 
Weibull distribution as discussed in the methodology. The estimated parameters are then used 
with effective ages of the assets to calculate their conditional reliability over time. The Weibull 
conditional reliability function provides the best estimate of the upcoming failures as it accounts 
for the survival of the asset prior to the forecast. To further illustrate that, the figures below show 
the change in the probability density functions of the assets given that they survive a specific 
age. The specific ages for the assets are their effective ages. Despite the height of density 
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function increases with the survival or the effective age of the assets, the area under the curve is 
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5.5. Integrated Asset Management System (IAMS) model for the City of Sugar Land, 
TX 
The results from the single asset models are exported using macro-enabled queries to get the list 
of sections with the replacement year, and the asset inventory is imported to the designed model 
using a Visual Basic Interface. The interface allows the user to load all the data into a SQL 
server, making it a cross-asset model. The SQL server is built the library functions from Python 
to compute the failure probabilities, map the failure probabilities with the COF and the asset’s 
replacement cost to calculate the yearly BCP number. Furthermore, the server also provides the 
sections for the replacement prioritized using the yearly BCP number. The output from the 
model is linked with Microsoft Power-Bi to generate and visualize the results. The figure below 
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Figure 17: Process Model for the Integrated Asset Management System (IAMS) 




The figure below shows the flowchart of the designed IAMS model.  
1. Firstly, the user loads all the required data into the SQL server. 
2. The model then checks if an asset belongs to the linear or the point category. 
3. If linear, the model calls for the yearly BCP number of all the assets from the linear asset 
model and stores them in a table. Similarly, for point assets, the model calls the point asset 
model and store the results of the yearly BCP number in a table. 
4. After the calculation of the yearly BCP number is done for all the assets, the model combines 
the tables of linear and points assets and checks for the user-defined yearly budget scenario. 
Figure 18: Flow model for the Integrated Asset Management System model 
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5. The assets are then ranked by the first year BCP number in decreasing order and selected for 
replacement as 1st year program until supported by the budget. 
6. Step 5 is repeated with ranking the remaining sections by next year's BCP number and 
selected for replacement as next year's program until supported by the budget. 
7. The selected sections are clustered into groups based on their spatial coordinates or the asset 
type to plan the annual replacement programs. 
8. The model finally shows the projected performance of the assets at the network level. The 
performances include: 
i. A decrease in the network level break rate or the number of failures in linear assets. 
ii. Increase in the average reliability of the network in point assets. 
iii. A decrease in the number of assets in a very high- and high-risk category in both 
linear and point assets. 
 
The IAMS model is designed with a set of queries that calculates the yearly BCP number of 
linear assets and point assets separately. Once the model identifies the asset type as a linear, it 
processes the workflow for the linear asset model as discussed below: 
1. The user imports the asset data for the linear assets into the IAMS model, and the model calls 
for the queries designed for the linear asset model to calculate the yearly BCP number. 
2. The user specifies the scale factor to be used to calculate the consequence of failure. The 
scale factors are the multiplier used to quantitatively access the consequence of failure. The 
model uses the scale factor of 1 as default to evaluate the COF. The scale factor 1 uses the 
default values of the COF as it is from the database. 
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3. If the assets have an existing proprietary model (e.g., Water Mains), the model calculates the 
failure probabilities, and yearly BCP number of the sections retrieved by the existing model 
(Path I); if not, the model calculates the failure probabilities and yearly BCP number of all 
sections (Path II). 
i. The example below shows the calculation of the yearly BCP number of the sections 
in Water Mains without using the existing proprietary model provided by the 
proprietary model. 
ii. Linearize the condition equation for the given length to determine the constants λ1 
and λ2. 
iii. Determine the failure density for the specific pipe segment. 
iv. Determine the failure probability for the pipe segment. 
v. Estimate the yearly number of failures in the pipe segment over time. 
vi. Aggregate the yearly number of failures for all pipe segments overtime to get the 
cumulative and annual failures in the water mains network over time. 
vii. Determine the yearly BCP number for each pipe segment and retrieve the results into 
the main model. 
 
The figure below shows the flowchart of the linear asset model using the example of 


















If the model identifies the asset type as a point, it processes the workflow for the point asset 
model as discussed below: 
1. The user imports the asset data for the point assets into the IAMS model, and the model calls 
for the queries designed for the point asset model to calculate the yearly BCP number. 
2. The user specifies the scale factor to be used to calculate the consequence of failure. The 
scale factors are the multiplier used to quantitatively access the consequence of failure. The 
model uses the scale factor of 1 as default to evaluating the consequence of failure. 
3. If the assets have an existing proprietary model (e.g., Lift Stations), the model calculates the 
conditional reliabilities, failure probabilities, and yearly BCP number of the sections 
retrieved by the existing model (Path I); if not, the model calculates the failure probabilities 
and yearly BCP number of all sections (Path II). 
The example below shows the calculation of the yearly BCP number of the assets in the Lift 
Stations without using the existing proprietary model provided by the City of Sugar Land. 
i. Load the condition function for the assets and determine the effective age of the 
assets from the LOF scores. 
ii. Estimate the shape and scale parameters of the 2-parameters Weibull distribution 
using the estimated end useful life of the asset and coefficient of variation as 20%. 
iii. Estimate the reliability, and failure probability using the survival analysis for the 
Weibull distribution. 





The figure below shows the flowchart of the point asset model using the example of the 
lift stations assets. 
 
 




5.6. Prioritization Strategies for the Preventive Maintenance 
After analyzing the asset inventory data and applying the methodology of the discussed model, 
the obtained results are shown in this section. Several tables and plots are presented to analyze 
and visualize the results from the model. Similarly, three different strategies are presented to 
visualize the differences in the outcomes. The strategies compared and presented in this section 
are risk-based prioritization, asset-based prioritization, and location-based prioritization for water 
mains and lift station assets.  
5.6.1. Risk-based Prioritization 
Risk-based prioritization deals with replacing the sections with the highest yearly BCP number. 
The yearly failure probabilities of each asset are calculated based on their condition parameters. 
The yearly failure probabilities multiplied with the expected failure consequences value gives the 
yearly BCP number. Firstly, for any specified budget scenario, the sections are sorted according 
to their first year BCP number. The sections with the highest values are replaced until the budget 
for the first year is exhausted. The remaining sections are sorted according to their second year 
BCP number and replaced until the budget for that year is exhausted. The process is repeated for 
the number of years specified by the decision-maker. The table below shows the result of the 
risk-based prioritization using a yearly budget of $5.0 million for 10 years. 
 
Table 24: Risk based prioritization results for the yearly budget of $5.0 m for 10 years 
Asset Category Total Assets Replaced Total Expenditure Replacement Year 
Water Mains 7 $283,240 
1 Lift Stations 128 $4,712,300.00 
Total 135 $4,995,540 
Water Mains 8 $552,583 
2 Lift Stations 91 $4,234,200.00 
Total 99 $4,786,783 
 87 
 
Table 24: Continued 
Asset Category Total Assets Replaced Total Expenditure Replacement Year 
Water Mains 10 $1,019,480 
3 Lift Stations 133 $4,178,300.00 
Total 143 $5,197,780 
Water Mains 27 $2,053,531 
4 Lift Stations 78 $2,725,400.00 
Total 105 $4,778,931 
Water Mains 11 $473,147 
5 Lift Stations 139 $4,705,800.00 
Total 150 $5,178,947 
Water Mains 93 $3,417,411 
6 Lift Stations 30 $1,359,400.00 
Total 123 $4,776,811 
Water Mains 63 $3,344,764 
7 Lift Stations 45 $1,831,800.00 
Total 108 $5,196,564 
Water Mains 151 $4,700,790 
8 Lift Stations 0 $0 
Total 151 $4,700,790 
Water Mains 129 $4,606,629 
9 Lift Stations 25 $691,800.00 
Total 154 $5,298,429 
Water Mains 88 $4,671,581 
10 Lift Stations 0 $0 


















Comparison of total yearly expenditure between the facilities
Water Mains Lift Stations
Figure 21: Comparison of the yearly expenditure between the facilities 
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The figure above shows the distribution of yearly expenditures between the water mains 
and lift stations. From the figure above, we can see that lift stations are initially prioritized for 
replacement over the water mains because most of the assets in lift stations such as SCADA, 
odor controls, and portable bypass pumps have an estimated life of ten years, resulting in a 
higher probability of failures. Furthermore, other reasons could be a higher value of COF 
associated with the failure of these assets. To interpret the results better, the tables below provide 
the results of Water Mains in terms of the risk matrix.  
Table 25: Risk Matrix for the Water Mains at present 
Current Condition for the Water Mains 
 1 (VL) 2 (L) 3 (M) 4 (H) 5 (VH) 
1 (VL) 328.03 13.97 97.26 7.43 1.25 
2 (L) 96.29 1.89 39.02 3.39 0.03 
3 (M) 28.06 0.62 2.94 0.19 0.17 
4 (H) 18.34 0.28 2.8 0.18 0.02 
5 (VH) 7.86  0.14   
 
Table 26: Risk Matrix for the Water Mains if nothing is done for 10 years 
Do Nothing for next 10 years  
 1 (VL) 2 (L) 3 (M) 4 (H) 5 (VH) 
1 (VL) 263.29 78.71 13.58 80.3 12.07 
2 (L) 72.66 22.3 9.04 30.26 6.37 
3 (M) 23.47 3.96 0.66 3.33 0.55 
4 (H) 14.51 3.95 1.11 1.85 0.2 
5 (VH) 7.34 0.52 0.05 0.09  
 
Table 27: Risk Matrix for the Water Mains after 10 years of Cross-Asset Maintenance 
After 10 years of the Cross-Asset Preventive Maintenance  
 1 (VL) 2 (L) 3 (M) 4 (H) 5 (VH) 
1 (VL) 263.3 78.71 13.58 80.3 12.07 
2 (L) 89.1 22.34 9.04 18.86 1.29 
3 (M) 26.24 4.32 0.17 1.24  
4 (H) 16.37 4.95 0.13 0.16  




Similarly, the tables below provide the results of Lift Stations in terms of the risk matrix. 
Table 28: Risk Matrix for the Lift Stations at present 
Current Condition for the Lift Stations 
 1 (VL) 2 (L) 3 (M) 4 (H) 5 (VH) 
1 (VL)  8 2  16 
2 (L)  113 48 39 35 
3 (M) 15 212 152 118 139 
4 (H) 7 64 49 43 42 
5 (VH)  13 5 5 1 
 
Table 29: Risk Matrix for the Lift Stations if nothing is done for 10 years 
Do Nothing for next 10 years 
 1 (VL) 2 (L) 3 (M) 4 (H) 5 (VH) 
1 (VL)    5 21 
2 (L)    43 192 
3 (M)   12 87 537 
4 (H)   4 29 172 
5 (VH)    7 17 
 
Table 30: Risk Matrix for the Lift Stations after 10 years of Cross-Asset Maintenance 
After 10 years of the Cross-Asset Preventive Maintenance  
 1 (VL) 2 (L) 3 (M) 4 (H) 5 (VH) 
1 (VL)    5 21 
2 (L)  6 4 43 182 
3 (M) 194 229 36 84 93 
4 (H) 117 66 6  16 
5 (VH) 14 7 3   
 
While the risk-based prioritization provides the sections for replacement based on the 
yearly BCP number, the approach does not account for the economies of scale, i.e., location and 
the type of assets for prioritization. Since the model is dependent on the yearly budget, there is a 
higher likelihood for the city to work in the same area every alternate year because of the 
insufficient budget. For example, two similar pipes with the same benefits at the same location or 
two similar pumps with the same benefits at the same lift station could be prioritized to be 
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replaced in different years because of the insufficient budget. However, this problem can be 
solved using an asset-based prioritization or a location-based prioritization strategy. In this 
project, we consider both the strategies as viable ones for the lift stations but only location-based 
for the water mains because of the limited asset types in the water mains, i.e., AC and PVC. 
5.6.2. Asset-based Prioritization 
Asset-based prioritization primarily deals with replacing all the assets of a particular type in a 
specific year. The prioritization is based on the average replacement age of all the assets in a 
particular group. The main aim of asset-based prioritization is that it provides the management 
with an opportunity to outsource the replacement by accepting the lowest bids. In other words, it 
provides the flexibility to the managers to find a contractor who provides the best offer for the 
maintenance of a particular group and replace/maintain it. The table below provides the results of 
asset-based prioritization for replacement in the lift stations. 
 
Table 31: Asset based prioritization of the lift stations 
Cluster Asset Type Average B/C Total Cost Average Replacement Yr. 
Number 
of Assets 
7 Controls 1.026384 $6,998,000 4.49 99 
3 Generator ATS 1.006997 $254,000 4 3 
6 Grounds 0.873572 $2,928,000 3.31 87 
1 Odor Control 0.586414 $376,000 1 2 
9 Pipes 0.845903 $767,600 3.4 96 
1 Portable Bypass Pump 0.569614 $89,000 1 1 
4 SCADA 0.537136 $875,000 1.49 35 
5 Stationary Bypass Pump 0.808119 $3,278,000 2.93 30 
8 Sub 0.863736 $5,897,800 3.48 181 
3 Sub Grinder 1.024687 $87,400 4.2 5 
10 Valves 0.866846 $1,851,200 3.41 96 




Table 32: Results of the asset-based prioritization of the lift stations 







0.578014 $465,000 1 3 
4 SCADA 0.537136 $875,000 1.49 35 
5 Stationary Bypass Pump 0.808119 $3,278,000 2.93 30 
6 Grounds 0.873572 $2,928,000 3.31 87 
9 Pipes 0.845903 $767,600 3.4 96 
10 Valves 0.866846 $1,851,200 3.41 96 
8 Submersible Pump 0.863736 $5,897,800 3.48 181 
3 Generator ATS, Sub Grinder Pump 1.015842 $341,400 4.1 8 
7 Controls 1.026384 $6,998,000 4.49 99 
2 Wet Well 1.356569 $1,057,000 7.21 34 
 
The results from the table 32 show that the maximum reduction in the risk or maximum 
benefit is achieved if all the Odor Controls, Portable Bypass are replaced first, followed by the 
SCADA, Pumps, and ultimately Wet Wells. Since the risk associated with an asset’s failure is a 
function of its direct and indirect cost, given that the direct cost is an independent variable, 
replacing the assets in the ascending order of the average replacement year as shown in the table 
above will ensure a maximum reduction in the indirect cost. 
5.6.3. Location-based Prioritization 
Location-based prioritization is a clustering approach of dividing the assets into groups around a 
specific location and allotting them into the same group using K-means clustering algorithms. K-
means clustering is a centroid-based approach to partition the dataset, where k is the number of 
user-specified centroids or the division, and means is the averaging method to determine the 
location of the centroid. In this project, the coordinates of the assets are assumed to be point-
shape files and are calculated using the GIS. Then, the decision-maker defines the number of 
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required clusters based on the number of projects they want. The clusters are calculated as the 
sum of squared distances Euclidean distances between items and the corresponding centroid. 
Each data point is assigned to a given cluster such that the sum of squares distance of the 
observation to their assigned cluster centers is minimized. The clustering in this project is 
performed using Power-Bi which uses the syntax of R programming. The table below shows the 
location-based prioritization of the water mains and lift stations respectively.  
 
Table 33: Location based prioritization of the Water Mains using K-Means 
Clusters Miles replaced Average B/C 
Average 
Year Total Cost Index 
Cluster10 0.207201 0.99104 4 $191,377  
Cluster6 5.639085 1.330976 6.91 $5,833,616  
Cluster9 2.75825 1.31633 6.95 $2,780,442  
Cluster4 4.197629 1.36198 7.06 $4,953,275  
Cluster3 0.85393 1.392482 7.5 $747,297  
Cluster8 0.75106 1.423964 7.92 $841,892  
Cluster5 2.374085 1.436877 7.98 $2,633,505  
Cluster1 1.365803 1.445033 8.04 $1,439,399  
Cluster2 3.985614 1.485981 8.29 $4,748,672  
Cluster7 0.782909 1.569405 9.28 $953,681  
 
Table 34: Location based prioritization of the Lift Stations using K-Means 




Year Total Cost Index 
Cluster3 59 0.809177 3.05 $2,404,400  
Cluster10 29 0.786746 3.14 $968,800  
Cluster7 65 0.817758 3.15 $1,917,000  
Cluster9 75 0.845408 3.39 $2,315,400  
Cluster1 98 0.86976 3.54 $2,746,000  
Cluster6 73 0.892256 3.6 $3,162,900  
Cluster5 43 0.907259 3.72 $1,807,600  
Cluster2 94 0.9363 3.86 $4,359,600  
Cluster4 69 0.987406 4.22 $2,593,900  







The figure above shows the spatial clustering of the water mains assets identified by the 
model for replacement using the K-means approach. The results of the model shown were run 
considering the assets in water mains and the lift stations with a yearly budget scenario of $5.0 











The figure above shows the spatial clustering of the lift station assets identified by the model 
for replacement using the K-means approach. The results of the model shown were run 
considering the assets in water mains and the lift stations with a yearly budget scenario of $5.0 









6.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This chapter interprets and discusses the results of the developed model on the asset database of 
the City of Sugar Land, TX. It further analyzes whether the primary objective of the research, 
i.e., to develop a framework that evaluates risk in the multiple assets, prioritize them in terms of 
their benefit of replacement, and allocate the replacement budget, has been achieved or not. The 
results of the model are analyzed using the comparison of outputs between the two-yearly budget 
scenarios of $3.0 million and $5.0 million for 10 years in terms of the following:  
i. A decrease in the number of assets in a very high- and high-risk category in both linear 
and point assets. 
ii. A decrease in the network level break rate or the number of failures in linear assets. 
iii. An increase in the average reliability of the network in point assets. 
6.1. Comparative analysis of the results using two funding scenarios 
The table below shows the comparison of the results of the risk-based prioritization using two-
yearly budget scenarios of $3.0 million (A) and $5.0 million (B) for 10 years. It can be seen that 
the total number of assets replaced each year increases with the increase in the yearly budget. 
While the total number of assets replaced with the yearly budget of $3.0 million for 10 years is 
746, the total number of assets replaced with the yearly budget of $5.0 million for 10 years is 
1256. 
Table 35: Comparative analysis of results of $3.0m and $5.0m yearly budget scenario 
Asset 
Category 
$3.0 million per year (A) $5.0 million per year (B) Replacement 







Water Mains 1 $13,715  7 $283,240 
1 Lift Stations 78 $2,956,800  128 $4,712,300.00 
Total 79 $2,970,515  135 $4,995,540 
Water Mains 6 $269,525  8 $552,583 2 Lift Stations 67 $2,698,500  91 $4,234,200.00 
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$3.0 million per year (A) $5.0 million per year (B) Replacement 







Total 73 $2,968,025  99 $4,786,783  
Water Mains 8 $552,583  10 $1,019,480 
3 Lift Stations 66 $2,455,200  133 $4,178,300.00 
Total 74 $3,007,783  143 $5,197,780 
Water Mains 16 $1,261,294  27 $2,053,531 
4 Lift Stations 26 $1,701,700  78 $2,725,400.00 
Total 42 $2,962,994  105 $4,778,931 
Water Mains 14 $815,873  11 $473,147 
5 Lift Stations 77 $2,213,500  139 $4,705,800.00 
Total 91 $3,029,373  150 $5,178,947 
Water Mains 7 $995,844  93 $3,417,411 
6 Lift Stations 66 $1,959,200  30 $1,359,400.00 
Total 73 $2,955,044  123 $4,776,811 
Water Mains 56 $2,258,522  63 $3,344,764 
7 Lift Stations 12 $763,900  45 $1,831,800.00 
Total 68 $3,022,422  108 $5,196,564 
Water Mains 19 $689,182  151 $4,700,790 
8 Lift Stations 109 $2,259,200  0 $0 
Total 128 $2,948,382  151 $4,700,790 
Water Mains 45 $1,720,823  129 $4,606,629 
9 Lift Stations 21 $1,321,000  25 $691,800.00 
Total 66 $3,041,823  154 $5,298,429 
Water Mains 50 $2,828,257  88 $4,671,581 
10 Lift Stations 2 $77,000  0 $0 
Total 52 $2,905,257  88 $4,671,581 
Overall 7461 $29,811,618 1256 $49,582,156  
 
 
It can be seen that the number of water mains prioritized to be replaced increases gradually 
over time in both scenarios. Furthermore, we can also see that the number of water mains 
decreases with the increase in the number of lift stations and vice-versa. There could be several 
reasons associated with it, which are discussed as follows: 
i. The water mains primarily consist of AC and PVC pipes whose expected useful life is 70 
years (Chrysotile Institute) and 100 years (Sustainable Solutions Corp., 2017), 
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respectively. On the other hand, the expected useful life of the assets in the lift stations in 
the City of Sugar Land ranges from 10 to 30 years. As a result, the probability of failure 
of the assets in the lift stations is comparatively higher than the assets in the water mains. 
The higher probability of failure directly correlates to the higher yearly BCP number. 
Since the designed framework prioritizes the assets based on their yearly BCP number, 
the majority of the assets in the lift station are replaced earlier than the assets in the water 
mains. The box plots below show that the average yearly BCP of the replaced assets in 
the water mains and the lift stations. We can see that the average value of yearly BCP is 
quite similar in both cases; however, referring back to the values in table 35, more assets 
in the lift stations are replaced compared to the water mains. From this, it can be 
understood that there are a higher number of assets scheduled to be replaced in the lift 































ii. The limitation in the funding can be another reason for prioritizing the assets in the lift 
station over water mains during the initial years. The unit cost of replacement of the 
assets in the water mains varies from $60 to $357 without the casing and $242 to $1,200 
with the casing (see Appendix). On the other hand, the unit cost of replacement of the 
assets in the lift station varies from $1,000 to $188,000 (see Appendix). The unit costs 
for water mains might look less than the lift station; however, the total cost of 
replacement of the water mains is significantly higher than the lift stations because of its 
length. For example, let us assume that a SCADA panel from the lift station with the 
replacement costs $25,000 per unit and a 1000 ft. 6 in. AC pipe from the water mains 






























Figure 25: Box Plot showing the yearly BCP of the assets in the Water Mains 
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funding, the SCADA panel is selected for the replacement whereas, the AC pipe is 
postponed for the next year. The table below shows the average replacement cost of the 
assets in the water mains and the lift stations using the yearly funding scenario of $5.0 
million for 10 years. 
 
Table 36: Average replacement cost of the prioritized assets in the Water Mains 
 
 
Table 37: Average replacement cost of the prioritized assets in the Lift Station 
Asset Type Total Count Average Cost Total Cost 
Controls 99 $70,686.87 $6,998,000.00 
Generator ATS 3 $84,666.67 $254,000.00 
Grounds 87 $33,655.17 $2,928,000.00 
Odor Control 2 $188,000.00 $376,000.00 
Pipes 96 $7,995.83 $767,600.00 
Portable Bypass Pump 1 $89,000.00 $89,000.00 
SCADA 35 $25,000.00 $875,000.00 
Stationary Bypass Pump 30 $109,266.67 $3,278,000.00 
Sub 181 $32,584.53 $5,897,800.00 
Sub Grinder 5 $17,480.00 $87,400.00 
Valves 96 $19,283.33 $1,851,200.00 
Wet Well 34 $31,088.24 $1,057,000.00 
Total 669 $708,707.3068 $24,459,000 
 
From the tables above, we can see that a majority of the 12 in. diameter pipes in the 
water mains were prioritized for the replacement. The unit cost per feet of 12in. diameter 
pipe is $119 without the casing and $480 with the casing. Considering the average length 
of the 12in. diameter pipe to be 215ft. and replacement cost to be $119 per ft., the total 






(mi.) Total Cost 
Water Mains 6 287.702 $30,726.17 0.327 $184,357.00 
Water Mains 8 279.753 $41,281.77 1.907 $1,446,725.00 
Water Mains 10 108.74 $22,870.34 2.265 $2,515,737.00 
Water Mains 12 223.530 $48,221.46 18.416 $20,976,337.00 
Total  899.976  22.916 $25,123,156.00 
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cost of replacement of a section of pipe is $25,585 which is greater than the unit 
replacement cost of the 56% of the assets in the lift stations.  
6.2. Analysis of the results in terms of the risk matrices 
The risk matrix below provides the visual demonstration of the risk in the water mains by rating 
them in the categories of likelihood and consequence. The risks are divided into very high, 
medium, fair, and low categories, and the categories are represented using the red, orange, 
yellow, and green colors, respectively. The table below shows the comparison of the results of 
the risk matrix in the water mains using the two funding scenarios. From the table, we can see 
that, at present, 0.51 and 9.63 miles of pipes in the water mains are at the very high and medium 
risk category, respectively. Doing nothing for the next 10 years will increase the numbers 
approximately by fifteen times in very high and seven times in the medium-risk category, 
making it 8.12 miles and 62.79 miles, respectively. A failure of these assets will result in 
significant damage to the economy, service, and reputation. However, using a yearly preventive 
maintenance budget of $3.0 million for 10 years will bring the numbers down to 2.02 miles at 
very high risk and 59.81 miles at a medium risk category. Increasing the yearly preventive 
maintenance budget to $5.0 million for 10 years will further decrease the assets at very high risk 
to 1.86 miles and medium risk to 48.55 miles. In other words, the assets at a very high-risk 
category will decrease by approximately 75% using the $3.0 million and 77% using the $5.0 
million yearly budget for 10 years. Similarly, the assets at a moderate risk category will decrease 





Table 38: Comparison of the results of Water Mains Risk Matrix using multiple scenarios 
Water Mains 
Current Scenario Do Nothing $3.0 Million per year 
$5.0 Million per 
year 


















4 27.66 75.96 78.24 77.87 
5 9.11 103.12 103.18 103.38 









9 2.94 1.30 1.30 1.30 
10 0.03 49.26 45.69 33.92 









16 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.29 
20 0.02 3.18 0.29 0.00 
25 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Total 650.16 650.16 650.16 650.16 650.16 650.16 650.16 650.16 
 
The table below shows the comparison of the results of the risk matrix in the lift stations 
using the two funding scenarios. From the table, we can see that, at present, 235 and 470 assets 
in the lift stations are at the very high and medium risk category, respectively. Doing nothing for 
the next 10 years, the assets at a very high-risk category will increase significantly to 762 which 
is approximately four times. Similar to that of the water mains, a failure of these assets will also 
result in significant damage to the economy, service, and reputation. However, using a yearly 
preventive maintenance budget of $3.0 million for 10 years will bring the numbers down to 243 
at very high risk and 438 at a medium risk category. Increasing the yearly preventive 
maintenance budget to $5.0 million for 10 years will further decrease the number of assets to 112 
and 424 at a very high and medium risk category. In other words, the assets at a very high-risk 
category will decrease by approximately 68% using the $3.0 million and 85% using the $5.0 
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million yearly budget for 10 years. On contrary, the assets at a moderate risk category will 
increase by approximately 30% and 25% by using the $3.0 million and $5.0 million yearly 
budget, respectively. One of the reasons for the increase in the number of the assets in the 
moderate risk category can be linked to the estimated useful life of the lift stations' assets 
replaced in the initial years. Assets such as odor controls, portable bypass pumps, and SCADA 
have a EUL of 10 years; thus, when these get replaced in the early year, the assets will still be 
prone to failure in the later years. Therefore, despite their replacement in the first couple of 
years, these assets will continue to have a higher failure probability in later years, resulting in an 
increase in the number of assets in the moderate risk category. 
 
Table 39: Comparison of the results of Lift Stations Risk Matrix using multiple scenarios 
Lift Stations 
Current Scenario Do Nothing $3.0 Million per year 
$5.0 Million per 
year 


















4 120 5 110 128 
5 16 21 35 35 









9 152 12 36 36 
10 48 192 197 189 









16 43 29 9 0 
20 47 179 16 16 
25 1 17 0 0 




From the results, we can observe that the overall risk matrix of the water mains does not 
change notably compared to the lift station. The reason behind this is that out of approximately 
34,000 assets in the water mains the model prioritizes replacing roughly around 600, i.e., 1.78%.  
On the other hand, the model prioritizes replacing around 60% of the assets in the lift station, 
which significantly changes the risk matrix. However, if we consider the number of assets at 
very high risk only, we can see a significant reduction in both the water mains and the lift 
stations.  
6.3. Analysis of the results in terms of the network level expected annual number of failures 
in the linear assets 
The network-level failure curve provides information regarding the expected annual number of 
failures at the network. The expected annual number of failures is the cumulative sum of the 
annual number of failures at each section. It is very important to calculate the expected annual 
























Comparison of Annual Failures in Water Mains at the Network level in 10 
years
Do Nothing $3 Million $5 Million
Figure 26: Comparison of expected annual number of failures in Water Mains at the network level 
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performance can be achieved at what cost? Furthermore, it also helps the decision-makers to 
define the threshold performance level and allocate the budget accordingly.  
The figure above shows the comparison of the expected annual number of failures in the water 
mains network using the two funding scenarios for 10 years. From the figure, we can observe 
that the expected annual number of failures in the water mains network is 20.88 failures per 100 
miles in 10 years when no preventive maintenance actions are performed. However, using a 
yearly funding scenario of $3.0 million and $5.0 million would decrease the number to 20.12 and 
19.36 failures per 100 miles over 10 years, respectively. The decrease in the expected annual 
number of failures is not significant because of the following reasons: 
i) Since less than 5% of the pipe miles are replaced in both scenarios, the change in the 
number of failures is not very significant. The number of failures will drastically decrease 
if the number of pipe miles increases. 
ii) A limitation in the funding results in the few sections being prioritized for the 
replacement, ultimately leading to a small change in the expected annual number of 
failures. The table below provides an overview of the expected annual failures with the 
funding scenario. 
 





Number of Failures 
per 100 miles 
Miles 
Replaced Total Miles 
% Sections 
Replaced 
$3.0 Million 20.12 11.03 650.16 1.70% 
$5.0 Million 19.36 22.92 650.16 3.53% 




It can be observed from the table above that the expected annual number of failures in the 
water mains network decreases with the increase in the yearly budget. The increase in the budget 
results in an increase in the miles of pipe being replaced, which significantly decreases the 
probability of failure. 
6.4. Analysis of the results in terms of the network level average reliability in the point 
assets 
The network-level average reliability curve provides information regarding the average 
reliability of the system at the network level. The network-level average reliability is the average 
yearly reliability of each asset. Similar to the annual number of failures, the average network 
level reliability helps the decision-makers to define the threshold performance level and allocate 
the budget accordingly. The figure below shows the comparison of the yearly average reliability 




















Comparison of the Average Reliability in Lift Station at the Network Level 
in 10 years
Do Nothing $3 Million $5 Million
Figure 27: Comparison of average reliability in Lift Station at the network level 
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From the figure, we can observe that the network level average reliability of the assets in 
the lift station is 0.25 in 10 years when no preventive maintenance actions are performed. 
However, using a yearly funding scenario of $3.0 million and $5.0 million would increase the 
average reliability to 0.35 and 0.37 in 10 years, respectively. The increase in the network level 
average reliability is not significant between the two scenarios because: firstly, only an additional 
140 assets get replaced with the $5.0 million budget scenario compared to the $3.0 million 
scenarios. Secondly, most of the assets prioritized for the replacement in the lift stations with 
expected useful life between 10 to 15 years is subjected to have a higher probability of failure in 
the later years when replaced early. For example, the probability of failure in the assets such as 
SCADA, Bypass Pumps, Odor Control, Grounds, and Valves when replaced in initial years is 
more than 50% in the later years, resulting in a decrease in the network level reliability. 
Furthermore, the majority of the assets in the lift station prioritized for early replacement belong 
to the categories mentioned above. 
Overall, from the results, it can be observed that the objectives of the decrease in the 
number of failures, increase in the average reliability, and decrease in the number of assets in the 
high-risk category in the risk matrix can be achieved by an increase in the annual funding. 
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7.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The goal of this research is to develop a decision-making framework for allocating the budget for 
the integrated asset management system.  The decision-making framework for an integrated asset 
management system lies in the foundation of economics and engineering principles to maintain 
the condition of the assets and plan their maintenance. This research project provides a 
methodology for the management of the multiple facilities in a city using risk-based multi-
criteria maintenance and rehabilitation resource allocation. 
The first chapter discusses the topic of infrastructure management in general. It discusses 
the different types of assets in a facility and the challenges in managing them. The challenges 
primarily include but are not limited to the deteriorating and aging assets, budget constraints, 
changing customer demands, and socio-economic-environmental considerations. These 
infrastructures provide services, accommodations, and foster social communication and 
economic development of a city. It is, therefore, crucial to maintain them despite the challenges. 
It provides insights into the involvement of the public and private sectors in the business of asset 
management and highlights the primary reasons for the poor condition of infrastructures by 
citing it to lack of effective strategic planning, unavailability of budgets, and deficiency in the 
failure prediction models. The chapter ends by introducing the motivation of this research to 
develop a model that can combine multiple assets with unique traits into a single domain and 
effectively plan the MR&R strategies for the city. 
The second chapter discusses the background of infrastructure management. It starts by 
summarizing the deteriorating condition of infrastructures in the United States from the late '80s 
to the present and discusses the budget deficiency with the required funding to maintain the 
infrastructures in adequate condition. The chapter discusses a typical infrastructure life cycle can 
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be divided into two stages: construction and maintenance and highlights the importance of the 
efficient framework for the maintenance stage. The framework should connect the asset database 
with analytical, engineering, and economic methods to make a rational, objective-centric, and 
cost-effective decision. Furthermore, the chapter reviews the existing practices of infrastructure 
management into two categories: ad-hoc and strategic. The ad-hoc or conventional approach 
involves the MR&R of the assets when need. This approach, however, is limited as a temporary 
focus on an issue may result in a contrary impact on other operations of other components in a 
system. The strategic asset management practices, on the other hand, include the use of concepts 
such as system dynamics, multi-criteria decision analysis, analytical-hierarchical process, 
decision support system, statistical and mathematical modeling, and risk-based approaches. 
However, there are multiple hurdles associated with using strategic asset management which 
includes: 
i. The requirement multitude of data such as installation year, utility maps, material type, 
thickness, diameter, construction details, local policies, and so forth, which may not 
necessarily be stored and organized by a single owner/entity. Even if available, they 
usually are disintegrated, inconsistent, and in incompatible formats. 
ii. The interdependency problem among the assets, as the maintenance of one infrastructure, 
may likely to have an impact on the condition of other infrastructures, causing a stream of 
problems. 
iii. The selection of a specific method that could forecast the performance of the 
infrastructure over time, predict the consequences of a decision on the infrastructure 




The third chapter introduces the term risk along with its terminologies and standard risk 
management practices in various industries. It further discusses the difference between risk and 
uncertainty and their assessment in infrastructure management. The uncertainties are mainly 
induced due to an error in data collection methods or associated with the existing data or 
historical data, the assumptions in forecasting techniques that deal with the events happening in 
the future, and residual error resulting from the discrepancy between the model projected and the 
observed values. The assessment methods include qualitative and quantitative analysis such as i) 
knowledge-based or expert-based techniques, ii) sensitivity assessment, and iii) probabilistic 
models. Moreover, the chapter discusses the importance of risk management and the risk 
management framework in infrastructure management. The chapter introduces the concept of 
using system reliability and stochastic process for managing the risks of infrastructures and 
planning their preventive maintenance. 
The fourth chapter presents the methodology and framework intending to provide a solution 
for the cross-asset management problem typically faced by the city councils. The chapter deals 
with using a risk-based reliability-centric asset management approach to combine the different 
single asset management strategies into a cross-asset management model.  The model works on a 
basic principle that the risk associated with an asset's failure is the function of the direct and 
indirect cost of replacement. While the direct cost is the cost per unit of replacement, the indirect 
cost is the additional cost related to the failure, which cannot be easily quantified in terms of the 
monetary units. The indirect costs include but may not be limited to the failure to deliver and 
maintain the required LOS, damage to the reputation, environmental damage, litigations, 
increase in the backlogs resulting in exceeding budgets, and so forth. The model works by 
estimating the failure probabilities and the associated consequence of the failure to derive the 
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indirect cost connected with the asset's failure. The indirect costs associated with the failure 
assets allow the decision-maker to visualize the trade-off between the assets in monetary units.  
The assets are divided into two categories to predict the failure probabilities: linear assets and 
point assets. Linear assets are the assets with fixed start and end co-ordinates measured in linear 
units. In this project, the failure of linear assets is modeled by deriving a relationship between the 
rate of change of failure (intensity function) from the stochastic process with the failure density 
function from the reliability process. The relationship works by dividing the linear assets into 
homogenous sections where the expected number of failures in the sections are independent and 
follow a binomial expectation. The reason for using this relationship is because the stochastic 
process provides a good estimate of the network-level failure; nevertheless, it does provide the 
expected failures in the individual sections when accessing the component level analysis.  
On the other hand, point assets are the size and location-specific assets which do not 
require segmentation for the treatment prioritization. Unlike linear, the condition function for the 
point assets is only dependent on its type, i.e., the failure in the pipes is dependent not only on its 
type but also on its length, whereas a specific category of pumps is expected to have a similar 
nature of the failure. Point assets in this project are modeled using a-2 parameter Weibull 
distribution where the parameters are the function of the expected life and coefficient of variation 
of the assets. The failure probabilities in the assets are estimated using a conditional reliability 
function, which, in turn, is calculated using the effective age of the asset. Effective age is the 
behavioral age of the asset calculated to generalize their failure patterns. The effective age of an 
asset is the function of its likelihood of failure, i.e., a two-year-old pump with a higher likelihood 
of failure is assumed to behave like a ten or twelve-year-old pump, depending on its condition 
function. The failure probability is then estimated considering that the asset has survived the 
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effective age. The estimated failure probabilities in linear and point assets are combined with the 
COF and the cost of replacement to determine the yearly BCP number to prioritize the cross-
asset maintenance. The BCP number is the benefit that the city gets from replacing a particular 
asset at a specified year compared to other assets. The chapter further discusses the various 
clustering approaches to optimize the resource and develop the annual maintenance program. 
The fifth chapter is the case study where the designed IAMS model was applied to the existing 
asset database at the City of Sugar Land, TX. The City of Sugar Land has nine different 
infrastructure facilities: Water, Wastewater, Mobility, Drainage & Stormwater Management, 
Facilities, Fleets, Parks & Recreation, Aviation, and Information Technology. However, in this 
project, the methodology was applied only to the water mains and lift station database. The 
calculations are performed using the queries designed in Microsoft Access, and the results are 
visualized using the interface in Microsoft Power Bi.   
The sixth chapter discusses the results obtained by applying the developed framework in the 
asset database of the City of Sugar Land. The results of the model are interpreted in terms of: 
iv. A decrease in the network level break rate or the number of failures in linear assets. 
v. Increase in the average reliability of the network in point assets. 
vi. A decrease in the number of assets in a very high- and high-risk category in both linear 
and point assets. 
It was found that objectives of decrease in the network level number of failures, increase in 
the network level average reliability, and decrease in the number of assets in the high-risk 
category in the risk matrix can be achieved by an increase in the annual funding. However, an 
absolute zero risk cannot be achieved unless all the assets are replaced in the same year and 
analyzed in the following year. 
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Since the model is designed using SQL, there are still some limitations to the model. Firstly, 
the queries used in the design of the model are very specific to the data types, fields, and table 
names. Therefore, even a slight change to the data structure can yield different or no results at 
all. Secondly, the model considers the replacement of an asset or a component as the best 
preventive maintenance strategy. Despite the replacement of the assets, we still consider it to be 
preventive maintenance because it is similar to the analogy of replacing an oil filter in a car, 
which is the replacement for the filter but preventive maintenance to the overall car. Similarly, 
the replacement of an asset is the replacement for the asset itself, but it is just a preventive 
maintenance strategy for the overall network. Therefore, future advancement on this project can 
be considered both rehabilitation as well as replacement as the viable maintenance strategy and 
for prioritizing the assets. 
Overall, the risk based IAMS model emphasizes a balance in budget allocation and 
distribution between the facilities by comparing the yearly BCP number among the assets. The 
higher budget is allocated to those assets which provides maximum benefit to the city. It further 
allows the decision-makers to compare the risks and benefits of the replacement of the assets 
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A.1 Weibull Conditional Reliability for the assets with the EUL 10 
 
Years R(t) F(t) R(t|5) F(t|5) R(t|8) F(t|8) R(t|10) F(t|10) R(t|13) F(t|13) R(t|15) F(t|15) 
0 1.0000 0.0000           
1 0.9879 0.0121           
2 0.9579 0.0421           
3 0.9139 0.0861           
4 0.8589 0.1411           
5 0.7959 0.2041 1.0000 0.0000         
6 0.7274 0.2726 0.9140 0.0860         
7 0.6561 0.3439 0.8244 0.1756         
8 0.5843 0.4157 0.7341 0.2659 1.0000 0.0000       
9 0.5138 0.4862 0.6456 0.3544 0.8794 0.1206       
10 0.4463 0.5537 0.5608 0.4392 0.7638 0.2362 1.0000 0.0000     
11 0.3830 0.6170 0.4812 0.5188 0.6555 0.3445 0.8582 0.1418     
12 0.3248 0.6752 0.4081 0.5919 0.5559 0.4441 0.7278 0.2722     
13 0.2723 0.7277 0.3421 0.6579 0.4660 0.5340 0.6101 0.3899 1.0000 0.0000   
14 0.2256 0.7744 0.2835 0.7165 0.3861 0.6139 0.5055 0.4945 0.8286 0.1714   
15 0.1848 0.8152 0.2322 0.7678 0.3163 0.6837 0.4142 0.5858 0.6789 0.3211 1.0000 0.0000 
16 0.1497 0.8503 0.1881 0.8119 0.2563 0.7437 0.3355 0.6645 0.5500 0.4500 0.8101 0.1899 
17 0.1200 0.8800 0.1507 0.8493 0.2053 0.7947 0.2688 0.7312 0.4406 0.5594 0.6491 0.3509 
18 0.0951 0.9049 0.1195 0.8805 0.1627 0.8373 0.2130 0.7870 0.3492 0.6508 0.5144 0.4856 
19 0.0745 0.9255 0.0936 0.9064 0.1276 0.8724 0.1670 0.8330 0.2737 0.7263 0.4032 0.5968 
20 0.0578 0.9422 0.0726 0.9274 0.0989 0.9011 0.1295 0.8705 0.2123 0.7877 0.3127 0.6873 
21 0.0443 0.9557 0.0557 0.9443 0.0759 0.9241 0.0994 0.9006 0.1629 0.8371 0.2399 0.7601 
22 0.0337 0.9663 0.0423 0.9577 0.0576 0.9424 0.0754 0.9246 0.1237 0.8763 0.1822 0.8178 
23 0.0253 0.9747 0.0318 0.9682 0.0433 0.9567 0.0567 0.9433 0.0929 0.9071 0.1369 0.8631 
24 0.0188 0.9812 0.0236 0.9764 0.0322 0.9678 0.0421 0.9579 0.0691 0.9309 0.1018 0.8982 
25 0.0138 0.9862 0.0174 0.9826 0.0237 0.9763 0.0310 0.9690 0.0508 0.9492 0.0749 0.9251 
 120 
 
26 0.0101 0.9899 0.0127 0.9873 0.0173 0.9827 0.0226 0.9774 0.0370 0.9630 0.0545 0.9455 
27 0.0073 0.9927 0.0091 0.9909 0.0124 0.9876 0.0163 0.9837 0.0267 0.9733 0.0393 0.9607 
28 0.0052 0.9948 0.0065 0.9935 0.0089 0.9911 0.0116 0.9884 0.0191 0.9809 0.0281 0.9719 
29 0.0037 0.9963 0.0046 0.9954 0.0063 0.9937 0.0082 0.9918 0.0135 0.9865 0.0198 0.9802 
30 0.0026 0.9974 0.0032 0.9968 0.0044 0.9956 0.0057 0.9943 0.0094 0.9906 0.0139 0.9861 
31 0.0018 0.9982 0.0022 0.9978 0.0030 0.9970 0.0040 0.9960 0.0065 0.9935 0.0096 0.9904 
32 0.0012 0.9988 0.0015 0.9985 0.0021 0.9979 0.0027 0.9973 0.0045 0.9955 0.0066 0.9934 
33 0.0008 0.9992 0.0010 0.9990 0.0014 0.9986 0.0019 0.9981 0.0030 0.9970 0.0045 0.9955 
34 0.0006 0.9994 0.0007 0.9993 0.0010 0.9990 0.0012 0.9988 0.0020 0.9980 0.0030 0.9970 
35 0.0004 0.9996 0.0005 0.9995 0.0006 0.9994 0.0008 0.9992 0.0014 0.9986 0.0020 0.9980 
 
A.2 Weibull Conditional Reliability for the assets with the EUL 15 
 
Years R(t) F(t) R(t|8) F(t|8) R(t|12) F(t|12) R(t|15) F(t|15) R(t|19) F(t|19) R(t|23) F(t|23) 
0 1.0000 0.0000           
1 0.9942 0.0058           
2 0.9796 0.0204           
3 0.9579 0.0421           
4 0.9299 0.0701           
5 0.8966 0.1034           
6 0.8589 0.1411           
7 0.8176 0.1824           
8 0.7735 0.2265 1.0000 0.0000         
9 0.7274 0.2726 0.9404 0.0596         
10 0.6801 0.3199 0.8792 0.1208         
11 0.6321 0.3679 0.8172 0.1828         
12 0.5843 0.4157 0.7553 0.2447 1.0000 0.0000       
13 0.5370 0.4630 0.6943 0.3057 0.9191 0.0809       
14 0.4909 0.5091 0.6346 0.3654 0.8402 0.1598       
15 0.4463 0.5537 0.5769 0.4231 0.7638 0.2362 1.0000 0.0000     
16 0.4036 0.5964 0.5217 0.4783 0.6907 0.3093 0.9043 0.0957     
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17 0.3630 0.6370 0.4693 0.5307 0.6213 0.3787 0.8134 0.1866     
18 0.3248 0.6752 0.4199 0.5801 0.5559 0.4441 0.7278 0.2722     
19 0.2891 0.7109 0.3738 0.6262 0.4948 0.5052 0.6479 0.3521 1.0000 0.0000   
20 0.2560 0.7440 0.3310 0.6690 0.4382 0.5618 0.5737 0.4263 0.8856 0.1144   
21 0.2256 0.7744 0.2917 0.7083 0.3861 0.6139 0.5055 0.4945 0.7803 0.2197   
22 0.1978 0.8022 0.2557 0.7443 0.3385 0.6615 0.4432 0.5568 0.6840 0.3160   
23 0.1725 0.8275 0.2230 0.7770 0.2953 0.7047 0.3866 0.6134 0.5967 0.4033 1.0000 0.0000 
24 0.1497 0.8503 0.1936 0.8064 0.2563 0.7437 0.3355 0.6645 0.5179 0.4821 0.8680 0.1320 
25 0.1293 0.8707 0.1672 0.8328 0.2213 0.7787 0.2898 0.7102 0.4473 0.5527 0.7496 0.2504 
26 0.1111 0.8889 0.1437 0.8563 0.1902 0.8098 0.2491 0.7509 0.3844 0.6156 0.6443 0.3557 
27 0.0951 0.9049 0.1229 0.8771 0.1627 0.8373 0.2130 0.7870 0.3288 0.6712 0.5511 0.4489 
28 0.0809 0.9191 0.1046 0.8954 0.1385 0.8615 0.1813 0.8187 0.2799 0.7201 0.4691 0.5309 
29 0.0685 0.9315 0.0886 0.9114 0.1173 0.8827 0.1536 0.8464 0.2371 0.7629 0.3973 0.6027 
30 0.0578 0.9422 0.0747 0.9253 0.0989 0.9011 0.1295 0.8705 0.1999 0.8001 0.3350 0.6650 
31 0.0485 0.9515 0.0627 0.9373 0.0830 0.9170 0.1087 0.8913 0.1677 0.8323 0.2811 0.7189 
32 0.0405 0.9595 0.0524 0.9476 0.0693 0.9307 0.0907 0.9093 0.1401 0.8599 0.2348 0.7652 
33 0.0337 0.9663 0.0435 0.9565 0.0576 0.9424 0.0754 0.9246 0.1164 0.8836 0.1951 0.8049 
34 0.0279 0.9721 0.0360 0.9640 0.0477 0.9523 0.0624 0.9376 0.0963 0.9037 0.1615 0.8385 
35 0.0229 0.9771 0.0297 0.9703 0.0393 0.9607 0.0514 0.9486 0.0793 0.9207 0.1330 0.8670 
36 0.0188 0.9812 0.0243 0.9757 0.0322 0.9678 0.0421 0.9579 0.0650 0.9350 0.1090 0.8910 
37 0.0153 0.9847 0.0198 0.9802 0.0263 0.9737 0.0344 0.9656 0.0531 0.9469 0.0890 0.9110 
38 0.0125 0.9875 0.0161 0.9839 0.0213 0.9787 0.0279 0.9721 0.0431 0.9569 0.0723 0.9277 
39 0.0101 0.9899 0.0130 0.9870 0.0173 0.9827 0.0226 0.9774 0.0349 0.9651 0.0584 0.9416 
40 0.0081 0.9919 0.0105 0.9895 0.0139 0.9861 0.0182 0.9818 0.0281 0.9719 0.0470 0.9530 
41 0.0065 0.9935 0.0084 0.9916 0.0111 0.9889 0.0146 0.9854 0.0225 0.9775 0.0377 0.9623 
42 0.0052 0.9948 0.0067 0.9933 0.0089 0.9911 0.0116 0.9884 0.0179 0.9821 0.0301 0.9699 
43 0.0041 0.9959 0.0053 0.9947 0.0071 0.9929 0.0092 0.9908 0.0143 0.9857 0.0239 0.9761 
44 0.0033 0.9967 0.0042 0.9958 0.0056 0.9944 0.0073 0.9927 0.0113 0.9887 0.0189 0.9811 
45 0.0026 0.9974 0.0033 0.9967 0.0044 0.9956 0.0057 0.9943 0.0089 0.9911 0.0149 0.9851 
46 0.0020 0.9980 0.0026 0.9974 0.0034 0.9966 0.0045 0.9955 0.0070 0.9930 0.0117 0.9883 
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47 0.0016 0.9984 0.0020 0.9980 0.0027 0.9973 0.0035 0.9965 0.0054 0.9946 0.0091 0.9909 
48 0.0012 0.9988 0.0016 0.9984 0.0021 0.9979 0.0027 0.9973 0.0042 0.9958 0.0071 0.9929 
49 0.0009 0.9991 0.0012 0.9988 0.0016 0.9984 0.0021 0.9979 0.0033 0.9967 0.0055 0.9945 
50 0.0007 0.9993 0.0009 0.9991 0.0012 0.9988 0.0016 0.9984 0.0025 0.9975 0.0042 0.9958 
 
A.3 Weibull Conditional Reliability for the assets with the EUL 20 
 
Years R(t) F(t) R(t|10) F(t|10) R(t|15) F(t|15) R(t|20) F(t|20) R(t|25) F(t|25) R(t|30) F(t|30) 
0 1.0000 0.0000           
1 0.9966 0.0034           
2 0.9879 0.0121           
3 0.9748 0.0252           
4 0.9579 0.0421           
5 0.9374 0.0626           
6 0.9139 0.0861           
7 0.8876 0.1124           
8 0.8589 0.1411           
9 0.8282 0.1718           
10 0.7959 0.2041 1.0000 0.0000         
11 0.7622 0.2378 0.9576 0.0424         
12 0.7274 0.2726 0.9140 0.0860         
13 0.6920 0.3080 0.8695 0.1305         
14 0.6561 0.3439 0.8244 0.1756         
15 0.6201 0.3799 0.7792 0.2208 1.0000 0.0000       
16 0.5843 0.4157 0.7341 0.2659 0.9422 0.0578       
17 0.5487 0.4513 0.6895 0.3105 0.8849 0.1151       
18 0.5138 0.4862 0.6456 0.3544 0.8285 0.1715       
19 0.4796 0.5204 0.6026 0.3974 0.7733 0.2267       
20 0.4463 0.5537 0.5607 0.4393 0.7196 0.2804 1.0000 0.0000     
21 0.4140 0.5860 0.5202 0.4798 0.6677 0.3323 0.9278 0.0722     
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22 0.3830 0.6170 0.4812 0.5188 0.6176 0.3824 0.8582 0.1418     
23 0.3532 0.6468 0.4438 0.5562 0.5696 0.4304 0.7915 0.2085     
24 0.3248 0.6752 0.4081 0.5919 0.5238 0.4762 0.7278 0.2722     
25 0.2978 0.7022 0.3742 0.6258 0.4802 0.5198 0.6673 0.3327 1.0000 0.0000   
26 0.2723 0.7277 0.3421 0.6579 0.4390 0.5610 0.6101 0.3899 0.9142 0.0858   
27 0.2482 0.7518 0.3119 0.6881 0.4002 0.5998 0.5561 0.4439 0.8334 0.1666   
28 0.2256 0.7744 0.2835 0.7165 0.3638 0.6362 0.5055 0.4945 0.7576 0.2424   
29 0.2045 0.7955 0.2569 0.7431 0.3297 0.6703 0.4582 0.5418 0.6867 0.3133   
30 0.1848 0.8152 0.2322 0.7678 0.2980 0.7020 0.4142 0.5858 0.6206 0.3794 1.0000 0.0000 
31 0.1666 0.8334 0.2093 0.7907 0.2686 0.7314 0.3733 0.6267 0.5594 0.4406 0.9013 0.0987 
32 0.1497 0.8503 0.1881 0.8119 0.2415 0.7585 0.3355 0.6645 0.5028 0.4972 0.8101 0.1899 
33 0.1342 0.8658 0.1686 0.8314 0.2164 0.7836 0.3007 0.6993 0.4507 0.5493 0.7261 0.2739 
34 0.1200 0.8800 0.1507 0.8493 0.1935 0.8065 0.2688 0.7312 0.4028 0.5972 0.6491 0.3509 
35 0.1069 0.8931 0.1344 0.8656 0.1724 0.8276 0.2396 0.7604 0.3591 0.6409 0.5786 0.4214 
36 0.0951 0.9049 0.1195 0.8805 0.1533 0.8467 0.2130 0.7870 0.3192 0.6808 0.5144 0.4856 
37 0.0843 0.9157 0.1059 0.8941 0.1359 0.8641 0.1889 0.8111 0.2830 0.7170 0.4560 0.5440 
38 0.0745 0.9255 0.0936 0.9064 0.1202 0.8798 0.1670 0.8330 0.2502 0.7498 0.4032 0.5968 
39 0.0657 0.9343 0.0826 0.9174 0.1060 0.8940 0.1473 0.8527 0.2207 0.7793 0.3555 0.6445 
40 0.0578 0.9422 0.0726 0.9274 0.0932 0.9068 0.1295 0.8705 0.1941 0.8059 0.3127 0.6873 
41 0.0507 0.9493 0.0637 0.9363 0.0817 0.9183 0.1136 0.8864 0.1702 0.8298 0.2743 0.7257 
42 0.0443 0.9557 0.0557 0.9443 0.0715 0.9285 0.0994 0.9006 0.1489 0.8511 0.2399 0.7601 
43 0.0387 0.9613 0.0486 0.9514 0.0624 0.9376 0.0867 0.9133 0.1299 0.8701 0.2093 0.7907 
44 0.0337 0.9663 0.0423 0.9577 0.0543 0.9457 0.0754 0.9246 0.1130 0.8870 0.1821 0.8179 
45 0.0292 0.9708 0.0367 0.9633 0.0471 0.9529 0.0655 0.9345 0.0981 0.9019 0.1581 0.8419 
46 0.0253 0.9747 0.0318 0.9682 0.0408 0.9592 0.0567 0.9433 0.0849 0.9151 0.1368 0.8632 
47 0.0218 0.9782 0.0274 0.9726 0.0352 0.9648 0.0489 0.9511 0.0733 0.9267 0.1182 0.8818 
48 0.0188 0.9812 0.0236 0.9764 0.0303 0.9697 0.0421 0.9579 0.0632 0.9368 0.1018 0.8982 
49 0.0162 0.9838 0.0203 0.9797 0.0260 0.9740 0.0362 0.9638 0.0542 0.9458 0.0874 0.9126 
50 0.0138 0.9862 0.0174 0.9826 0.0223 0.9777 0.0310 0.9690 0.0465 0.9535 0.0749 0.9251 
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A.4 Weibull Conditional Reliability for the assets with the EUL 25 
 
Years R(t) F(t) R(t|13) F(t|13) R(t|19) F(t|19) R(t|25) F(t|25) R(t|32) F(t|32) R(t|38) F(t|38) 
0 1.0000 0.0000           
1 0.9977 0.0023           
2 0.9919 0.0081           
3 0.9832 0.0168           
4 0.9717 0.0283           
5 0.9579 0.0421           
6 0.9418 0.0582           
7 0.9236 0.0764           
8 0.9037 0.0963           
9 0.8820 0.1180           
10 0.8589 0.1411           
11 0.8345 0.1655           
12 0.8090 0.1910           
13 0.7825 0.2175 1.0000 0.0000         
14 0.7553 0.2447 0.9652 0.0348         
15 0.7274 0.2726 0.9296 0.0704         
16 0.6991 0.3009 0.8934 0.1066         
17 0.6705 0.3295 0.8569 0.1431         
18 0.6417 0.3583 0.8201 0.1799         
19 0.6129 0.3871 0.7833 0.2167 1.0000 0.0000       
20 0.5843 0.4157 0.7466 0.2534 0.9532 0.0468       
21 0.5558 0.4442 0.7103 0.2897 0.9068 0.0932       
22 0.5277 0.4723 0.6743 0.3257 0.8609 0.1391       
23 0.5000 0.5000 0.6390 0.3610 0.8157 0.1843       
24 0.4728 0.5272 0.6042 0.3958 0.7714 0.2286       
25 0.4463 0.5537 0.5703 0.4297 0.7281 0.2719 1.0000 0.0000     
26 0.4204 0.5796 0.5372 0.4628 0.6859 0.3141 0.9420 0.0580     
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27 0.3953 0.6047 0.5051 0.4949 0.6448 0.3552 0.8857 0.1143     
28 0.3709 0.6291 0.4740 0.5260 0.6051 0.3949 0.8311 0.1689     
29 0.3474 0.6526 0.4440 0.5560 0.5668 0.4332 0.7785 0.2215     
30 0.3248 0.6752 0.4151 0.5849 0.5299 0.4701 0.7278 0.2722     
31 0.3031 0.6969 0.3873 0.6127 0.4945 0.5055 0.6791 0.3209     
32 0.2823 0.7177 0.3607 0.6393 0.4605 0.5395 0.6326 0.3674 1.0000 0.0000   
33 0.2624 0.7376 0.3354 0.6646 0.4282 0.5718 0.5881 0.4119 0.9297 0.0703   
34 0.2435 0.7565 0.3112 0.6888 0.3973 0.6027 0.5457 0.4543 0.8627 0.1373   
35 0.2256 0.7744 0.2883 0.7117 0.3680 0.6320 0.5055 0.4945 0.7992 0.2008   
36 0.2086 0.7914 0.2666 0.7334 0.3403 0.6597 0.4674 0.5326 0.7389 0.2611   
37 0.1925 0.8075 0.2460 0.7540 0.3141 0.6859 0.4314 0.5686 0.6820 0.3180   
38 0.1774 0.8226 0.2267 0.7733 0.2894 0.7106 0.3974 0.6026 0.6283 0.3717 1.0000 0.0000 
39 0.1631 0.8369 0.2084 0.7916 0.2661 0.7339 0.3655 0.6345 0.5778 0.4222 0.9196 0.0804 
40 0.1497 0.8503 0.1913 0.8087 0.2443 0.7557 0.3355 0.6645 0.5304 0.4696 0.8442 0.1558 
41 0.1372 0.8628 0.1753 0.8247 0.2238 0.7762 0.3075 0.6925 0.4860 0.5140 0.7736 0.2264 
42 0.1255 0.8745 0.1604 0.8396 0.2048 0.7952 0.2812 0.7188 0.4446 0.5554 0.7077 0.2923 
43 0.1146 0.8854 0.1465 0.8535 0.1870 0.8130 0.2568 0.7432 0.4060 0.5940 0.6462 0.3538 
44 0.1045 0.8955 0.1335 0.8665 0.1704 0.8296 0.2341 0.7659 0.3701 0.6299 0.5890 0.4110 
45 0.0951 0.9049 0.1215 0.8785 0.1551 0.8449 0.2130 0.7870 0.3368 0.6632 0.5360 0.4640 
46 0.0864 0.9136 0.1104 0.8896 0.1409 0.8591 0.1935 0.8065 0.3059 0.6941 0.4869 0.5131 
47 0.0783 0.9217 0.1001 0.8999 0.1277 0.8723 0.1755 0.8245 0.2774 0.7226 0.4415 0.5585 
48 0.0709 0.9291 0.0906 0.9094 0.1156 0.8844 0.1588 0.8412 0.2511 0.7489 0.3997 0.6003 
49 0.0641 0.9359 0.0819 0.9181 0.1045 0.8955 0.1435 0.8565 0.2269 0.7731 0.3612 0.6388 










A.5 Cost of Replacement of Pipes with their diameters in the Water Mains 
 
Pipe Description Min Diameter Max Diameter Replace Cost Open Cut / Boring Replace Cost w/ Casing 
6 in 0 6 $60 $242 
8 in 6 8 $79 $323 
10 in 8 10 $99 $403 
12 in 10 12 $119 $480 
14 in 12 14 $139 $565 
16 in 14 16 $159 $646 
18 in 16 18 $179 $727 
20 in 18 20 $198 $808 
22 in 20 22 $218 $888 
24 in 22 24 $238 $969 
26 in 24 26 $258 $1,005 
28 in 26 28 $278 $1,045 
30 in 28 30 $298 $1,080 
32 in 30 32 $317 $1,110 
36 in 32 36 $357 $1,200 
 
 
A.6 Cost of Replacement of Assets in the Lift Stations 
 
Asset Type Facility Size Replacement Cost Asset Type Facility Size Replacement Cost 
Blower Small $2,800 Generator ATS Large $102,000 
Controls Large duplex $78,000 Generator ATS Small duplex $50,000 
Controls Small duplex $63,000 Grounds Large duplex $36,000 
Controls Medium $69,000 Grounds Large $54,000 
Controls Small $1,000 Grounds Medium $28,000 
Controls Large $93,000 Grounds Small duplex $23,000 
Generator ATS Medium $69,000 Grounds Small $1,000 
Generator ATS Large duplex $71,000 Odor Control Large $188,000 
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Asset Type Facility Size Replacement Cost Asset Type Facility Size Replacement Cost 
Pipes Medium $7,000 Sub Medium $21,000 
Pipes Large $17,000 Sub Small $2,800 
Pipes Large duplex $8,000 Sub Small duplex $17,000 
Pipes Small duplex $7,000 Sub Large duplex $39,000 
Pipes Small $400 Sub Large $58,000 
Portable Bypass Pump Small duplex $89,000 Sub Grinder Large $58,000 
SCADA Small duplex $25,000 Sub Grinder Medium $21,000 
SCADA Small $25,000 Sub Grinder Small duplex $17,000 
SCADA Large duplex $25,000 Sub Grinder Large duplex $39,000 
SCADA Large $25,000 Sub Grinder Small $2,800 
SCADA Medium $25,000 Valves Small $400 
Self-Prime Cent Small duplex $17,000 Valves Small duplex $14,000 
Self-Prime Cent Medium $21,000 Valves Medium $15,000 
Self-Prime Cent Small $2,800 Valves Large duplex $19,000 
Self-Prime Cent Large duplex $39,000 Valves Large $49,000 
Self-Prime Cent Large $58,000 Wet Well Small $2,700 
Stationary Bypass Pump Small duplex $89,000 Wet Well Small duplex $16,000 
Stationary Bypass Pump Medium $89,000 Wet Well Large duplex $31,000 
Stationary Bypass Pump Large $132,000 Wet Well Large $63,000 
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